Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 60
Number 2 (Winter 2016)

Article 3

2016

Saving the United States from Lurching to Another Sentencing
Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair
Fixed Penalties
Mirko Bagaric
Deakin University, mbagaric@swinburne.edu.au

Sandeep Gopalan
Deakin University, sandeep.gopalan@deakin.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from Lurching to Another Sentencing Crisis:
Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed Penalties, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol60/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.
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SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING TO ANOTHER
SENTENCING CRISIS: TAKING PROPORTIONALITY SERIOUSLY
AND IMPLEMENTING FAIR FIXED PENALTIES
MIRKO BAGARIC* AND SANDEEP GOPALAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Bad policy is often only evident following its implementation. The weight
of consequences invariably trumps bad ideas. But in order for this to occur,
influential voices need to expose the falsehoods and their rewards. The enmity
that many people in the community have towards criminals explains why the
intellectually and normatively barren United States sentencing policy has
remained unchallenged for the past few decades.1 With only a hint of
exaggeration, that policy comes down to one main approach: incarceration.
This has resulted in the United States imprisoning more of its citizens than any
other nation—and by an enormous margin.2 It is an international outlier in the
imprisonment stakes. Paradoxically, it is also the nation from which the most
studies showing the ineffectiveness of imprisonment emanate.3 Americans
more so than any other people ought to know that incarceration is an
essentially flawed sentencing objective and that locking up ever more people
provides diminishing returns.4 As the 2015 report by the Brennan Center for

* Professor, Deakin University, Australia.
** Professor, Deakin University, Australia.
1. The tough on crime strategy is often referred to as the “Southern Strategy,” which was
effective in politicizing the law and order issues due to the parallel growth of a number of other
movements, including those relating to victims’ rights and the women’s movement. In addition to
this, the strategy was not heavily opposed because of the anxieties of “whites” about rising crime
and concerns about diminishing economic opportunities. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
116 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, THE HAMILTON PROJECT: A NEW
APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WHILE MAINTAINING LOW RATES OF CRIME 9
(2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/01-reduce-incarceration
-maintain-low-crime-raphaels-stollm/v5_thp_raphaelstoll-discpaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/KST7A726] (“The crime-reduction gains from higher incarceration rates depend critically on the
incarceration rate itself. When the incarceration rate is low, marginal gains from increasing the
incarceration rate are higher. This follows from the fact that when prisons are used sparingly,
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Justice notes, “incarceration in the U.S. has reached a level where it no longer
provides a meaningful crime reduction benefit.”5
The considerable fiscal burden stemming from imprisoning over two
million Americans is now weighing so heavily on the community that finally
there is a groundswell of opposition to the phenomenon of ever-increasing
prison numbers. This is backed up by research showing that crime can decrease
alongside decreases in the numbers of those in jail.6
We agree that prison numbers must be reduced. But it is important to
achieve this goal on the basis of empirically and normatively sound policies,
otherwise other serious problems may be created. The response to the prison
crisis thus far provides no foundation for confidence that a durable and
principled response is forthcoming. This Article redresses this concern.
We make recommendations regarding how the United States can
significantly lower its incarceration rate, while at the same time ensuring that
community safety is not diminished. Moreover, we identify and recommend a
consolidation and extension of the positive aspects of the current sentencing
regime.
incarceration is reserved for the highest-risk and most-serious offenders. By contrast, when the
incarceration rate is high, the marginal crime-reduction gains from further increases tend to be
lower, because the offender on the margin between incarceration and an alternative sanction tends
to be less serious. In other words, the crime-fighting benefits of incarceration diminish with the
scale of the prison population.”).
5. OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME
DECLINE? 7 (2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/What_Caused_
The_Crime_Decline.pdf [http://perma.cc/GM6X-GB7W]. “The incarceration rate jumped by
more than 60 percent from 1990 to 1999, while the rate of violent crime dropped by 28 percent.
In the next decade, the rate of incarceration increased by just 1 percent, while the violent crime
rate fell by 27 percent.” Id. The authors found that the decline in crime was attributable to
“increased numbers of police officers, deploying data-driven policing techniques such as
CompStat, changes in income, decreased alcohol consumption, and an aging population.” Id. at
10. The report did not have state level data on abortions and could not make any original findings
on that theory. However, the authors ventured “[b]ased on an analysis of the past findings, it is
possible that some portion of the decline in 1990s could be attributed to the legalization of
abortion. . . . Even if the abortion theory is valid, it is unlikely that an increase in abortions had
much effect on a crime drop in the 2000s. The first cohort that would have been theoretically
affected by abortion, 10 years after the 1990s, would be well beyond the most common crime
committing ages in the 2000s.” Id. at 61.
6. The Brennan Center Report found:
New York saw a 26 percent reduction in imprisonment and a 28 percent reduction in
property crime. Imprisonment and crime both decreased by more than 15 percent in
California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. These five states alone
represent more than 30 percent of the U.S. population. In addition, eight states—
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Utah—lowered their imprisonment rates by 2 to 15 percent while
experiencing more than a 15 percent decrease in crime.
Id. at 27.
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A distinguishing feature of the United States sentencing system is the
heavy reliance on mandatory or presumptive penalties. Reliance on the grids in
which these penalties are prescribed has contributed significantly to the
incarceration crisis. It is not, however, adoption of grid sentencing per se that
has caused the problem. Rather, it is the content of the grids that is
misinformed. Grid sentencing is desirable. The key is correctly calibrating the
content of the grid. We endorse the concept of standard penalties but suggest
that they must be properly informed. The guiding determinant should be an old
principle that has been glossed over in United States sentencing:
proportionality.7 There is much confusion about what it means, and how it
ought to be applied in sentencing policy and practice.8 This is a fundamental
error. This Article argues that ensuring that the punishment fits the crime
should be front and center of the sentencing regime.
The outcome of this approach is that there will be a considerable lowering
in the sanctions imposed on nearly all offenders, except those who have
committed violent and sexual offenses. Property, fraud, immigration, and drug
criminals will still incur the enmity of the community, but this venting will no
longer result in the community punishing itself by paying billions of dollars to
warehouse them for no demonstrable, tangible benefit.
This Article proposes a new sentencing paradigm. The report by the United
States National Academy of Sciences in 2014 into the failure of forty years of
incarceration policy in the United States recommends that:
[F]ederal and state policy makers should revise current criminal justice policies
to significantly reduce the rate of incarceration in the United States. In
particular, they should reexamine policies regarding mandatory prison
sentences and long sentences. Policy makers should also take steps to improve
the experience of incarcerated men and women and reduce unnecessary harm
9
to their families and their communities.

7. Thomas A. Balmer, Some Thoughts on Proportionality, 87 OR. L. REV. 783, 784 (2008)
(“The idea that there should be some proportional relationship between a crime and the crime’s
punishment dates back at least to the Code of Hammurabi and the Mosaic codes that appear in the
Old Testament.”).
8. Id. at 804. Balmer writes that the Supreme Court’s inability to reach a majority in
Harmelin
[H]ighlights the difficulty of attempting to establish an objective test for determining
proportionality. States with their own proportionality clauses, like Oregon, are able to
avoid the threshold issue the Court has faced—whether the Eighth Amendment contains a
proportionality component at all. But once this threshold is crossed, the search for
standards of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment is equally difficult.
Id. Further, “[o]nly time will tell whether litigants can propose or the courts can articulate tests
for determining proportionality that are less subjective or that provide more analytical structure
than the stark ‘shocks the moral sense’ standard . . . .” Id. at 817; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (“[O]ur precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity.”).
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 9.
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We inject content into this recommendation. While the main focus of this
Article is theoretical in nature, we undertake the ambitious but necessary task
of setting out in concrete terms a new sentencing paradigm. This system should
replace the sentencing process in all parts of the United States, including the
federal jurisdiction. In short, the core aspects of our proposal are that:
1. There should be (only) twenty-two penalty levels;10 starting at zero to
six months’ imprisonment with the next level increasing to six to
twelve months.
2. Each penalty level should then reflect an increase of twelve months.
Thus, level twenty-one would equal twenty years’ imprisonment. The
next and highest level should be life imprisonment.
3. Each crime should have a standard penalty. This is determined by the
extent to which the typical form of that crime sets back the flourishing
of the typical victim.
4. The aim is to match the extent to which the interests of the victim have
been set back with the reduction in flourishing that is inflicted on the
offender by the sanction.
5. The only departures from the set penalty are seventeen aggravating and
mitigating considerations (which are clearly defined) and which justify
a predetermined deviation from the standard penalty in the order of ten
percent to fifty percent.
6. Prior convictions would be irrelevant to sentencing, except in the case
of serious sexual and violent offenders, but even then they should carry
far less weight in the sentencing calculus.
7. The maximum penalty for any drug, migration, property, and fraud
offenses should be ten years’ imprisonment.
The above framework is a radical departure from the existing sentencing
system. However, more radical is to maintain the current system or something
approximating the existing regime. The current system based on the idea of
mass incarceration is a failure: abjectly so.11 It makes victims of many
criminals by inflicting disproportionate punishments on them, and victims of
the communities by crippling them with burgeoning imprisonment costs. Our
proposal will cease inflicting gratuitous pain on criminals, drastically reduce
the prison budget, make the community no less safe, and enhance the
transparency and consistency of the sentencing process. This Article fills a

10. This is approximately half the number in some fixed penalty regimes. See infra Part III.
11. See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 951 (2013) (“Much has been written about the long-term
societal consequences of mass incarceration. These . . . include such phenomena as the promotion
of racial stigma, poverty, absent parents, loss of economic mobility, distorted marriage markets
for black women, detrimental effects on children, and increases in juvenile crime.”).
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void not only in the literature regarding the adoption of a new sentencing
paradigm, but even more importantly it remedies a serious pragmatic
institutional shortcoming. As has been noted recently, the last twenty years
have been a “period of drift” in the United States sentencing reform.12 During
this period, no states have created new comprehensive sentencing systems.13
In developing our proposal, we draw on some aspects of Australian
sentencing law. There are many shortcomings associated with Australian
sentencing;14 however, it has one considerable advantage over the regime in
the United States—its emphasis on proportionality as being a cardinal
consideration in determining penalty type and severity. In contrast, while there
is some recognition of the proportionality principle in the United States, in
reality it has fallen “into neglect.”15
In Part II of the Article, we explain the magnitude of the incarceration
burden. This is followed in Part III by an examination of the principal cause of
the increased prison numbers and the contours of the United States sentencing
system. Part IV analyses the principle of proportionality and establishes that it
is the bedrock upon which the sentencing system should be grounded. In Part
V of the Article, we discuss the reasons in favor of maintaining a fixed penalty
system, albeit one that is fundamentally different to existing models. In the
concluding remarks, we summarize our reform recommendations.16

12. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 73.
13. Id. at 74.
14. See infra Part V; see generally Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to
Arbitrariness: The Need to Abolish the Stain That Is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38 U. N.S. WALES
L.J. 76 (2015) [hereinafter Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness].
15. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 86; see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009) (“In noncapital cases . . . the Court has done virtually
nothing to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.”); Christopher J. DeClue, Comment,
Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly Disproportionate Test Is Simply the
Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in Disguise, 41 SW. L. REV. 533, 540–46, 572–79
(2012); Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746
(2012) (noting that that Eighth Amendment proportionality principle was long viewed as dead);
John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of
Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 80 (2010) (“It is time . . . to pronounce the body of Eighth
Amendment quantitative proportionality dead . . . .”); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (“[T]he body of law is messy and
complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint . . . .”).
16. A caveat to this is that we do not consider the desirability of capital punishment. The
United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan that still imposes the death penalty.
The literature and analysis regarding the desirability of the death penalty is voluminous. It can
only be examined in the context of a stand-alone dissertation focusing on this issue. This is not a
meaningful limitation to this paper given that not all states impose the death penalty (there are
thirty-one states that still have the death penalty). States With and Without the Death Penalty,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
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II. THE INCARCERATION CRISIS
As of 2013, more than two million Americans were in jail, which equates
to over 900 per one hundred thousand adults.17 This rate has more than
doubled over the past two decades18 and has been steadily rising much of the
past forty years.19 In its recent report, the United States National Research
Council notes: “Current incarceration rates are historically and comparatively
unprecedented. The United States has the highest incarceration rates in the
world, reaching extraordinary absolute levels in the most recent two
decades.”20 By contrast, most developed countries have rates of imprisonment
around five to ten times less than the United States.21
The main drawback of imprisonment from the community perspective of
imprisonment is its costs.22 While this has been rising gradually over the past
few decades, it is only in recent years that the tipping point in terms of
sustainability and affordability has been reached. The money spent on prisons
is now so large that it has become evident that every dollar spent on prisons is
a dollar lost for spending on activities, such as healthcare and education. In
terms of expenditure, it costs taxpayers in the United States on average
$31,286 in direct expenditures to house a prisoner for one year.23 The total

[http://perma.cc/EE7H-RPNY] (last updated Sept. 23, 2015). Since 1976, there have been 1427
executions. Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-year [http://perma.cc/DRN2-XLJA] (last updated Feb. 3, 2016). Only a relatively
small number of criminals are executed in the United States. Id.
17. The exact number of prisoners is 2,220,300, which equates to 910 per 100,000 adults.
LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 2, 4 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpus13.pdf [http://perma.cc/FHL7-VTYZ]. This number includes the approximately one-third
of prisoners who are in local jails. Id. at 2.
18. Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1OeQ
HFF [http://perma.cc/VL2S-9NUB].
19. In fact, during this period it has quadrupled. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
1, at 1.
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Of course, there is a high individual cost of imprisonment. As noted by the National
Research Council of the National Academies, “incarceration imposes pain and loss on both those
sentenced and, frequently, their families and others . . . .” Id. at 22. However, as a result of the
enmity towards offenders, these have not proven to be persuasive reasons in favor of reform. See
id.
23. According to a study by the Vera Institute of Justice, the average cost of a prisoner is
$31,286 per year. See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE
PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 10 (2012), http://www.vera.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/3VQW-TYCB]. This is higher in some states and cities. In New York, the average cost is
$60,076 per year. Id.
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spending on prisons is now over fifty billion dollars annually.24 The scale of
this, even for the world’s largest economy, is considerable. California now
spends more on prisons than higher education.25 Spending on corrections ranks
third, behind only Medicaid and education, in most state budgets:
Budgetary allocations for corrections have outpaced budget increases for
nearly all other key government services (often by wide margins), including
education, transportation, and public assistance. Today, state spending on
corrections is the third highest category of general fund expenditures in most
states, ranked behind Medicaid and education. Corrections budgets have
skyrocketed at a time when spending for other key social services and
26
government programs has slowed or contracted.

It is now widely accepted that the United States has an incarceration crisis.27
Vivien Stern, secretary general of Penal Reform International, states: “Among
mainstream politicians and commentators in Western Europe, it is a truism that
the criminal justice system of the United States is an inexplicable deformity.”28
Similar sentiments are also expressed at home. The United States Attorney
General Eric Holder said recently that “too many Americans go to too many
prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason. It’s
clear, at a basic level, that 20th-century criminal justice solutions are not

24. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., U. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S.
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 18 (May 2012), http://www.usfca.edu/sites/de
fault/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf [http://perma.cc/YAJ5-LT3S].
25. Hansook Oh, California Budgets $1 Billion More to Prisons Than Higher Education and
Leaves Students Hanging, SUNDIAL (Sept. 19, 2012), http://sundial.csun.edu/2012/09/californiabudgets-1-billion-more-to-prisons-than-higher-education-and-leaves-students-hanging/ [http://per
ma.cc/M3EU-URET].
26. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 314 (internal citation omitted).
27. It is widely accepted that the United States has a “serious over-punishment” and “mass
incarceration” problem. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing:
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295–96 (2013); see, e.g., SASHA
ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND VENGEANCE IN THE AGE OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT, at xiv–xv, xxiii (2007); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2012); ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING
COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 48–49 (2008); Todd R. Clear & James Austin,
Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 307, 307 (2009); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 27–28 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis and Criminal Justice,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 965–69, 983 (2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic:
Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 133
(2011); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 423–25
(2013).
28. Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 280 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
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adequate to overcome our 21st-century challenges.”29 In a later speech he
stated:
Perhaps most troubling is the fact that this astonishing rise in
incarceration—and the escalating costs it has imposed on our country, in terms
both economic and human—have not measurably benefited our society. We
can all be proud of the progress that’s been made at reducing the crime rate
over the past two decades—thanks to the tireless work of prosecutors and the
bravery of law enforcement officials across America. But statistics have
shown—and all of us have seen—that high incarceration rates and longer-thannecessary prison terms have not played a significant role in materially
improving public safety, reducing crime, or strengthening communities.
In fact, the opposite is often true. Two weeks ago, the Washington Post
reported that new analysis of crime data and incarceration rates—performed by
the Pew Charitable Trusts, and covering the period of 1994 to 2012—shows
that states with the most significant drops in crime also saw reductions in their
prison populations. States that took drastic steps to reduce their prison
populations—in many cases by percentages well into the double digits—saw
crime go down as well. And the one state—West Virginia—with the greatest
30
increase in its incarceration rate actually experienced an uptick in crime.

29. Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html [http://perma.cc/KM63-4BAY]. He went on to note:
While the entire U.S. population has increased by about a third since 1980, the federal
prison population has grown at an astonishing rate—by almost 800 percent. . . . [F]ederal
prisons are operating at nearly 40 percent above capacity. Even though this country
comprises just 5 percent of the world’s population, we incarcerate almost a quarter of the
world’s prisoners. More than 219,000 federal inmates are currently behind bars. Almost
half of them are serving time for drug-related crimes, and many have substance use
disorders. Nine to 10 million more people cycle through America’s local jails each
year. And roughly 40 percent of former federal prisoners—and more than 60 percent of
former state prisoners—are rearrested or have their supervision revoked within three years
after their release . . . .
Id.
30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, One Year After Launching Key Sentencing
Reforms, Attorney General Holder Announces First Drop in Federal Prison Population in More
Than Three Decades (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/one-year-after-launchingkey-setencing-reforms-attorney-general-holder-annouces-first-drop-0 [http://perma.cc/WQ2U-PH
QT]. The Attorney General added:
As the Post makes clear: “To the extent that there is any trend here, it’s actually that states
incarcerating people have seen smaller decreases in crime.” And this has been borne out
at the national level, as well. Since President Obama took office, both overall crime and
overall incarceration have decreased by approximately 10 percent. This is the first time
these two critical markers have declined together in more than 40 years. And although we
have a great deal of work to do—and although, last year, some states continued to record
growth in their prison populations—this is a signal achievement. We know that overincarceration crushes opportunity. We know it prevents people, and entire communities,
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The perceived fallacy of mass incarceration has gone from being a mainstay of
academic commentary to a common theme in the mainstream media. Rolling
Stone magazine published a major report in October 2014, focusing on the
injustice associated with long jail terms for drug offenders. The sentiment of
the report is conveyed in the following passage: “Widely enacted in the
Eighties and Nineties amid rising crime and racially coded political
fearmongering, mandatory penalties—like minimum sentences triggered by
drug weight, automatic sentencing enhancements, and three-strikes laws—have
flooded state and federal prisons with nonviolent offenders.”31 The report adds:
“For decades, lawyers, scholars, and judges have criticized mandatory drug
sentencing as oppressive and ineffective. Yet tens of thousands of nonviolent
offenders continue to languish behind bars.”32 A recent report in the New York
Times notes that America now spends more on prisons than food stamps:
Few things are better at conveying what a nation really cares than how it
spends its money. On that measure, Americans like to punish. The United
States spent about $80 billion on its system of jails and prisons in 2010—about
$260 for every resident of the nation. By contrast, its budget for food stamps
was $227 a person. In 2012, 2.2 million Americans were in jail or prison, a
larger share of the population than in any other country; and that is about five
times the average for fellow industrialized nations in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. The nation’s unique strategy on
crime underscores the distinct path followed by American social and economic
33
institutions compared with the rest of the industrialized world.

Thus, there is now an increasing recognition that something needs to be done
to reduce incarceration levels.34 And it is happening—slowly but not surely. In
2010, 2011, and 2012, there was a drop in imprisonment numbers. But it was
relatively small—approximately three percent.35 However, in 2013, prison

from getting on the right track. And we’ve seen that—as more and more government
leaders have gradually come to recognize—at a fundamental level, it challenges our
commitment to the cause of justice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Andrea Jones, The Nation’s Shame: The Injustice of Mandatory Minimums, ROLLING
STONE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-nations-shame-the-injus
tice-of-mandatory-minimums-20141007 [http://perma.cc/9A9C-CN5P].
32. Id.
33. Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2014, at B1. The State of Maryland spends ten times more on corrections than it does on
education. ROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 34.
34. See U.S. Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive Year During 2012, BUREAU
OF JUST. STAT. (July 25, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/p12acpr.cfm [http://perma.
cc/TZ79-C676].
35. Id. The decline only focused on prisoners completing terms of one year or more in prison
and fell from a high of 1,615,487 prisoners in 2009 to 1,571,013 in 2012. Id.
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numbers again started rising.36 The continuing high prison numbers has
prompted the implementation of novel measures to reduce the prison
population. In April 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to
reduce the sentencing guideline level for most federal offenses of drug
trafficking.37 These changes will apply retroactively, meaning that over 46,000
prisoners are eligible to have their cases reviewed for a penalty reduction,
which on average is likely to be reduced by two years and one month, resulting
in a savings of approximately 80,000 prison bed years (one bed year is
equivalent to a prisoner being in jail for one year).38 In November 2014, voters
in California approved “California Proposition 47, Reduced Penalties for Some
Crimes Initiative (2014),”39 which limited the operation of that state’s harsh
mandatory penalty regime by reducing some nonviolent offenses from felonies
to misdemeanors.40

36. There was an increase of 4300 prisoners in 2013 compared to 2012. While the federal
prison population decreased for the first time since 1980, this was more than offset by an increase
in the state prison population (the first increase since 2009). E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 (Sept. 2014).
37. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Reduce
Drug Trafficking Sentences: Commission Sends Amendments to Congress Including Provisions
to Implement the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.us
sc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/pressreleases/20140410_
Press_Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/37C7-4JMG].
38. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Unanimously
Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences: Commission
Authorizes Judges to Reduce Drug Sentences for Eligible Prisoners Beginning November 2015 If
Congress Allows Guidelines Change to Stand (July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf
[http://perma.cc/X8V6-DG4X].
39. In summary, the law:
● Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for certain drug possession offenses.
● Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for the following crimes when
amount involved is $950 or less: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and
forging/writing bad checks.
● Allows felony sentence for these offenses if person has previous conviction for crimes
such as rape, murder, or child molestation or is registered sex offender.
● Requires resentencing for persons serving felony sentences for these offenses unless
court finds unreasonable public safety risk.
● Applies savings to mental health and drug treatment programs, K–12 schools, and
crime victims.
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
34 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/9U7M-3K78].
40. The law was passed with a majority of fifty-nine percent of voters in favor of it. Kristina
Davis, Calif Cuts Penalties for Small Drug Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 4, 2014),

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING

179

Even members of the community are softening in their views about
criminals. The results of a poll published in October 2014 show that seventyseven percent of Americans are in favor of abolishing mandatory minimum
sentences for nonviolent drug offenses.41 The level of support for this proposal
increased from seventy-one percent when the same question was polled in
December 2013.42
Prior to examining how to fix the incarceration problem, we first look at its
causes.
III. WHERE IT WENT WRONG
A.

The Move to Harsh Fixed Penalties

The National Research Council in its recent report examining the rapid
escalation in the imprisonment rate43 notes that changes to sentencing systems
throughout the United States over the past few decades were precipitated by
periods of rising crime and a growing politicization of the problem.
While each state of the United States and the federal jurisdiction has its
own sentencing system,44 there is now some convergence among the respective
regimes. In particular, several key commonalties and themes exist, which
explain the rapid growth in the incarceration rate.
In the 1980s, the United States Congress and most state legislatures
enacted mandatory sentencing laws, which prescribed long prison terms for a
large number of offenses.45 Mandatory minimum or presumptive penalties46
now operate to varying degrees in all states.47 Prescribed penalties are typically
set out in sentencing grids, which normally use criminal history scores48 and
offense seriousness to calculate the appropriate penalty.

http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/nov/04/prop-47-misdemeanor-law-vote-elec
tion-drug/ [http://perma.cc/U9KY-W8UW].
41. REASON-RUPE, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: OCTOBER 2014 TOPLINE RESULTS 4 (Oct. 9,
2014), http://reason.com/assets/db/14128084586864.pdf [http://perma.cc/NMA2-Y4W2].
42. Id.
43. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 1–2.
44. Sentencing (and more generally the criminal law) in the United States is mainly the
province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000).
45. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3.
46. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of fixed or standard
penalties in this Article.
47. Mandatory minimums are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United States
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing systems in the
world). See DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 24, at 45–47 (noting that 137 of 168 surveyed
countries had some form of minimum penalties but none were as wide-ranging or severe as in the
United States).
48. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior convictions. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 395 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2013), http://www.ussc.
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It has been contended that none of these policies leading to the increase in
fixed penalties emanated from a clear theoretical foundation but rather
stemmed from “back-of-an-envelope calculations and collective intuitive
judgments.”49 In a similar vein, Berman and Bibas state, “Over the last halfcentury, sentencing has lurched from a lawless morass of hidden, unreviewable
discretion to a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules.”50 They
add that “[m]odern sentencing reforms have repudiated rehabilitation as a
dominant goal of sentencing. Many structured sentencing laws, including many
guideline sentencing systems and severe mandatory minimum sentences, are
designed principally to deter, incapacitate, and punish offenders.”51
The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty laws are found in the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“Federal
Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”).52 These Guidelines are important
because of the large number of offenders sentenced under this system and the
significant doctrinal influence they have exerted at the state level.53
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory in nature,
following the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Booker.54 However, sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in
approximately sixty percent of cases.55 The set penalties apply to most types of
offenses, including drug, fraud, and immigration crime. A United States

gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-pdf/2013_Guidelines_Manual_
Full.pdf [http://perma.cc/T82Z-72YN].
49. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for
Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVES 91, 93 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For further criticism
of the guidelines, see James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 176 (2010);
Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines,
58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2005).
50. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006).
51. Id. at 48.
52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 394.
53. Berman & Bibas, supra note 50, at 40. There are more than 200,000 federal prisoners.
CARSON, supra note 36, at 1.
54. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held
that aspects of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial. Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 477 (2011); Irizarry v. United
States, 553 U.S. 708, 708 (2008); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 239 (2008); Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007). For a
discussion about the impact of Booker, see Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The
Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227 (2014).
55. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug
Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010).
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Sentencing Commission Report in 2011 noted that the number of offenses with
set terms are increasing and the terms were increasing.56
As noted above, in terms of establishing the appropriate sentence, apart
from the offense severity, the other key variable that determines the sanction in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the prior history of the offender.57 In
relation to most offenses, a criminal history can approximately double the
presumptive sentence. For example, an offense at level fourteen58 in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines carries a presumptive penalty for a first
offender of imprisonment for fifteen to twenty-one months, which increases to
thirty-seven to forty-six months for an offender with thirteen or more criminal
history points.59 For an offense at level thirty-six, a first offender has a
presumptive penalty of 188 to 235 months, which increases to 324 to 405
months for an offender with the highest criminal history score. Thus, a bad
criminal history can add between 136 to 170 months (over fourteen years) to a
jail term.
Some of the harshest types of mandatory sentencing laws are the threestrikes laws, which have been adopted in over twenty states.60 The California
three-strikes laws61 are the most well known.62 Prior to these reforms,
offenders convicted of any felony who had two or more relevant previous
convictions were required to be sentenced to between twenty-five years to life
imprisonment. The importance attributed to previous convictions was
exemplified by the fact that the current offense did not have to be for a serious
and violent felony––any felony would do. This meant that some offenders
were sentenced to decades of imprisonment for relatively minor crimes.

56. Memorandum from the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Office of Research and Data & Office
of Gen. Counsel to Chair Saris, Comm’rs & Judith Sheon 24 (May 20, 2011), http://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research/retroactivity-analyses/fair-sentencing-act/20110520_Crack_
Retroactivity_Analysis.pdf [http://perma.cc/77M3-LLV9].
57. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1109 (2008) (highlighting the importance of a defendant’s criminal history in
assessing his or her sentence).
58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 394. The offense
levels range from one (least serious) to forty-three (most serious). Examples of level fourteen
offenses are criminal sexual abuse of a ward, failure to register as a sex offender, and bribery (if
the defendant is a public official). Id. at 62, 66, 128.
59. Id. at 395. The criminal history score ranges from zero to thirteen or more (worst
offending record). Id.
60. See James Austin et al., The Impact of ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’, 1 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 131, 132 (1999); Kelly McMurry, ‘Three-Strikes’ Laws Proving More Show Than Go, 33
TRIAL 12 (1997); Tonry, supra note 49, at 93.
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2015).
62. The Supreme Court has held that California’s three-strikes laws do not violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
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Defendants have been sentenced to twenty-five years to life where their last
offense was for a minor theft (which, prior to the three-strikes regime, would
normally have resulted in a non-custodial sentence). For example, Jerry
Dewayne Williams, a twenty-seven-year-old Californian, was ordered to be
imprisoned for twenty-five years to life without parole, for stealing a slice of
pepperoni pizza from a group of four youths, based on his previous
convictions.63 Gary Ewing was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for
shoplifting three golf clubs, each of which was worth $399.64 Prior to that, he
had been convicted for four serious or violent felonies.65
The California three-strikes laws were softened somewhat in 2012, such
that a term of at least twenty-five years would only be required where the third
offense was a serious or violent felony.66 In such cases, offenders continue to
receive a significant premium––they must be sentenced to double the term they
would have otherwise received for the instant offense.67 Thus, despite the
softening of the laws, they still provide severe penalties for serious and violent
offender third-strikers. As noted above, amendments in 2014 have further
reduced the harshness of this regime.
Perhaps the greatest indication of the harshness of United States sentencing
is that life without parole is mandatory upon conviction for at least one
specified offense in twenty-seven states.68 There are over 40,000 prisoners in
the United States serving life without parole.69 This greatly exceeds the
number of such prisoners in the rest of the world. In Australia, for example,
there are only fifty-nine prisoners serving life without parole.70
By any measure—even without the benefit of hindsight—most mandatory
penalty regimes seem harsh. But it is not the case that the systems were

63. Phil Reeves, ‘Life’ for Pizza Theft Enrages Lawyers, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3, 1995),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/life-for-pizza-theft-enrages-lawyers-1609876.html
[http://perma.cc/Y5PQ-H6F9].
64. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19.
65. Ewing appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of the
legislation. Id. at 30–31. For a discussion of the case, see Sara Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing:
Three Strikes Laws and the Limits of the Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review, in
CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 427, 428 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013), http://scholar
ship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2953&context=faculty_scholarship [http://perma.
cc/DRD9-9M3S].
66. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2015); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL
ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 48 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2012/general/pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/SLQ9-VWQY].
67. Id. at 50.
68. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences
in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 28 (2010).
69. Id. at 31.
70. DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 24, at 25. Thus, per capita, the incidence of life without
parole is fifty-one times higher in the United States than in Australia.
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implemented without considerable deliberation and research—simply, as is
discussed below, the research was lacking in one crucial area: matching the
severity of the crime to the harshness of the penalty.71
B.

Fixed Penalty Regime Not Implemented in Ignorance of Main Rationales
of Sentencing

Strong arguments can be made in favor of the view that penalties
prescribed in most mandatory or presumptive penalty regimes are excessive.
However, this is not necessarily because of a fundamentally flawed approach
to sentencing or ignorance of the main competing tensions and relevant issues.
To the contrary, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are informed by a deep
level of learning regarding the aims and objectives of sentencing.
To this end, the United States Sentencing Commission expressly notes that
the guidelines aim to “further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”72 Further, the
Guidelines state that “[t]he [Sentencing Reform] Act’s basic objective was to
enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an
effective, fair sentencing system.”73 The Guidelines add that “[m]ost observers
of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of
punishment in particular, is the control of crime.”74
Most astutely, the Sentencing Commission noted that “[a] philosophical
problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the differing
perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.”75 However, there was no
need to delve into this potential quagmire because “[a]s a practical matter, . . .
in most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will produce
the same or similar results.”76
Proportionality is pursued in the Guidelines “through a system that
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing
severity.”77 Moreover, the sentencing ranges were not developed in abstract or
against a purely theoretical model. They were influenced by an analysis of over
40,000 sentences, which had been imposed.78

71. The move to higher penalties is the principal reason for the increase in prison numbers.
However, it is not the sole cause. Another contributing factor was the “truth in sentencing laws,”
which increased the actual time served by prisoners. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at
79–83, 102.
72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 1.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 2–3.
78. Id. at 11 (“The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial guidelines with
considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal statutes in the United States
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Thus, the Sentencing Commission was highly cognizant of the main
challenges to sentencing. Despite this, the reforms failed for two key reasons.
First, its recommendations were not sufficiently informed by the efficacy of
sentencing to achieve the key orthodox objectives of sentencing in the form of
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and rehabilitation.
Secondly, proportionality was pursued in theory only. We now expand on
these observations.
C. Empirical Data Regarding What Can Be Achieved in Sentencing
In order for sentencing to best facilitate the needs of the community, it
needs to be evidence based. It is futile to pursue objectives that are
unattainable. This obvious truth has carried surprisingly little weight in the
sentencing realm. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider at length the
empirical findings, regarding the efficacy of punishment to achieve the
objectives of incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.79 However, the
trend of the findings is relatively consistent, and hence it is possible to provide
an overview of the relevant conclusions. In short, current empirical evidence
provides no basis for confidence that punishment is capable of achieving the
goal of specific deterrence.80 General deterrence works only in the absolute
sense,81 and the jury is still out on the capacity of the sentencing system to

Code. It began with those that were the basis for a significant number of prosecutions and sought
to place them in a rational order. It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of
these provisions and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied
on pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses based on
summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports,
the parole guidelines, and policy judgments.”).
79. One of us (Bagaric) has recently considered these at length in individual papers on each
of these objectives, and the discussion immediately below is a summary of the findings in these
papers: Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the
Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the
Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012) [hereinafter Bagaric, The Capacity of
Criminal Sanctions]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation: An
Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH
CRIM. L. 95 (2012) [hereinafter Bagaric, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation]; Mirko Bagaric &
Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work—and What It Means for
Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011) [hereinafter Bagaric, (Marginal) General Deterrence].
80. JOHN E. BERECOCHEA & DOROTHY R. JAMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., TIME SERVED IN
PRISON AND PAROLE OUTCOME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY REPORT NUMBER 2 16 (1981). This
was a study based on an experiment involving the early release of felons in California in 1970.
The authors found that “[w]ithin the first year and second year following release to parole, the
experimentals and controls did not differ on the likelihood of their being returned to prison . . . .
And there were no statistically significant differences between the experimentals and controls
among those who were not returned to prison.” Id.
81. See David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing
Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 32, 32 (2012). Abrams conducted a study using
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rehabilitate offenders. Incapacitation is effective to a minor degree, but it is
only justified in relation to serious sexual and violent offenders. We now
unpack these conclusions.
The success of incapacitation cannot be measured solely by the height of
the prison wall. Incapacitation is only effective if the offender would have
reoffended during the term of the prison sentence. Further, incapacitation has
an admittedly crude cost-benefit aspect. It is self-defeating to imprison
offenders in order to prevent them from committing minor or trivial offenses,
whose costs clearly exceed the damage from their crimes.82
There are no established models for determining with a high degree of
accuracy offenders who will reoffend.83 To the extent that sound predictions
can be made about reoffending, this is in relation to relatively minor
(especially property) offenses. However, the cost of imprisoning these
offenders normally outweighs the seriousness of the offense.84 In addition,
research has demonstrated that incarceration might have “criminogenic”
effects.85 Lower level offenders interact with more serious criminals in prison
and tend to commit graver crimes upon release. To be sure, there are complex
reasons for this phenomenon, including socialization into a criminal culture,
diminishment of lawful employment opportunities upon conviction,
deterioration of relationships, and negative mental well-being.86

add on gun laws passed by states enhancing sentences for offenders possessing firearms during
the commission of the crime. He found that there was a decline in the number of gun robberies in
the three years after the introduction of the laws. Id.
82. As noted in Part IV of this Article, this is not an accepted method for calibrating the cost
of crime, and hence this criterion should only be relevant if the nature of the crime is manifestly
minor.
83. Hence, the theory of selective incapacitation is flawed. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY &
PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 104, 104 (2009); Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders
Justifiable?, 6 J. APPLIED SECURITY RES. 317, 323–24 (2011). See generally Bernadette
McSherry & Patrick Keyzer, “Dangerous” People: An Overview, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE:
POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 3 (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011).
Most recently it has been suggested that habitual criminals and serious offenders have a different
brain anatomy compared to other people. Neuroimaging of the brain showed that such offenders
have less brain activity in certain areas of the brain, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated with self-awareness, learning from
past experiences, and emotions. See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 373 (2013).
84. Bagaric, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation, supra note 79, at 107.
85. Lynne M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from
State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 593 (2007).
86. CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., LIFE AFTER PRISON:
TRACKING THE EXPERIENCES OF MALE PRISONERS RETURNING TO CHICAGO, CLEVELAND, AND
HOUSTON 4–5 (May 2010), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/41
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It is essentially for these two reasons that the benefits of incapacitation
appear to have been minor. The United States National Academy of Sciences
notes: “The increase in incarceration [in the United States over the past four
decades] may have caused a decrease in crime, but the magnitude of the
reduction is highly uncertain and the results of most studies suggest it was
unlikely to have been large.”87
A recent report by the Brennan Center based upon an analysis of state
imprisonment data between 1980 and 2013 concluded that:
Incarceration has been declining in effectiveness as a crime control tactic since
before 1980. Since 2000, the effect on the crime rate of increasing
incarceration . . . has been essentially zero. Increased incarceration accounted
for approximately 6 percent of the reduction in property crime in the 1990s
(this could vary statistically from 0 to 12 percent), and accounted for less than
1 percent of the decline in property crime this century. Increased incarceration
has had little effect on the drop in violent crime in the past 24 years. In fact,
large states such as California, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas
88
have all reduced their prison populations while crime has continued to fall.

The Brennan Center Report elaborates that the ineffectiveness of incarceration
as a crime fighting tool might be owed to the fact that a large percentage of
“the increase in incarceration was driven by the imprisonment of nonviolent
and drug offenders. Today, half of state prisoners are serving time for
nonviolent crimes. Almost half of federal prisoners are serving time for drug
crimes. Further, two-thirds of jail inmates are merely awaiting trial.”89
The Sentencing Project noted that “[w]hile incarceration is one factor
affecting crime rates, its impact is more modest than many proponents suggest,
and is increasingly subject to diminishing returns.”90
While serious sexual and violent offenders do not reoffend at manifestly
high rates, it transpires that individuals with previous convictions for serious
offenses91 commit crime at a greater frequency than the rest of the criminal
population. Further, offenders with prior convictions for serious sexual and
violent offenses reoffend more frequently than first-time offenders.92 Thus, to

2100-Life-after-Prison-Tracking-the-Experiences-of-Male-Prisoners-Returning-to-ChicagoCleveland-and-Houston.PDF [http://perma.cc/P6V7-RN22].
87. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 4.
88. ROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 25.
90. RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 8 (2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_iandc
_complex.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD9Q-U54S].
91. See infra Part VII (arguing serious offenses are confined to sexual and assault offenses).
92. See NSW SENTENCING COUNCIL, HIGH-RISK VIOLENT OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND
POST-CUSTODY MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 20–25 (May 2012). Beyond this, there is no basis for
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the extent that incapacitation can be effective, there is some theoretical basis
for imposing harsher penalties on recidivist serious offenders. To this end, it
seems that while incapacitation does not justify additional prison time for
minor offenders, it can support a recidivist loading in the order of twenty to
fifty percent for serious sexual and violent offenders.93
“Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing individual
offenders for their transgressions, [and] thereby convincing them that crime
does not pay.”94 Specific deterrence “attempts to dissuade offenders from reoffending by inflicting an unpleasant experience on them (normally
imprisonment) which they will seek to avoid in the future.”95 The available
empirical data suggests that specific deterrence does not work. There is
nothing to suggest that offenders who have been subjected to harsh punishment
are less likely to reoffend than identically-placed offenders who are subjected
to lesser forms of punishment. Thus, there is no basis for pursuing the goal of
specific deterrence.96
The weight of evidence suggests that rehabilitation fares only slightly
better. Certain rehabilitative techniques have some degree of success for some
offenders, but there is no data to show that there are wide-ranging techniques
to reform all offenders.97 Rehabilitation should not drive sentencing outcomes

more accurately predicting future serious offending. See MCSHERRY & KEYZER, supra note 83, at
23–24; Black, supra note 83, at 317; McSherry & Keyzer, supra note 83, at 4–5.
93. See Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior Convictions of
the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous
Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 408–11 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, The
Punishment Should Fit the Crime] (arguing that this is consistent with the rate of reoffending of
these offenders).
94. Bagaric, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 79, at 159; see also Daniel S.
Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 124 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2009).
95. Bagaric, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 79, at 159.
96. See Nagin et al., supra note 94, at 115, 120; Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using
Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism
Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 383 (2010); DONALD RITCHIE, SENTENCING
ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCING MATTERS: DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF THE
EVIDENCE 22 (Apr. 2011); DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY,
THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING 2
(2009); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973); NEW S. WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, SENTENCING: REPORT 139
33 (July 2013).
97. See generally KAREN HESELTINE ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, PRISONBASED CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER REHABILITATION PROGRAMS: THE 2009 NATIONAL PICTURE
IN AUSTRALIA (2011), http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/5/6/4/%7b564B2ECA-4433-4E9BB4BA-29BD59071E81%7drpp112.pdf [http://perma.cc/37J2-B2EX]; Mark W. Lipsey & Francis
T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3
ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 297 (2007); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 152.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

188

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:169

unless and until it is demonstrated that the technique or program in question is
likely to produce positive attitudinal and behavioral reform in the offender.
The findings regarding general deterrence are also relatively settled.98 The
existing data show that in the absence of the threat of any punishment for
criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would readily dissipate; crime
would escalate and overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of people to lead
happy and fulfilled lives. Thus, general deterrence works in the absolute sense:
there is a connection between the existence of some forms of criminal sanction
and criminal conduct. However, there is insufficient evidence to support a
direct correlation between higher penalties and a reduction in the crime rate.99
The United States National Academy of Sciences notes: “The incremental
deterrent effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at best.
Because recidivism rates decline markedly with age, lengthy prison sentences,
unless they specifically target very high-rate or extremely dangerous offenders,
are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by incapacitation.”100
It follows that “[m]arginal general deterrence [which is the theory that
there is a direct] correlation between the severity of the sanction and the
prevalence of an offense” should be disregarded as a sentencing objective, at
least unless and until there is proof that it works.101 The fallacy that is marginal
general deterrence is highlighted by the fact that criminologists believe that it
does not work. For example, nearly ninety percent of criminologists believe
that the death penalty does not deter murder.102 That is comparable to scientific
consensus relating to the causes of global warming,103 yet legislatures and

98. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60–61 (1969); John K.
Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to
Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED
ECON. 569 (2001); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of
Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence
Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2003); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain
the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178 (2004); Richard Berk, New Claims
About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 303, 303 (2005); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 68, 90.
99. Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing: Why
Less Is More When It Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1202 (2014)
[hereinafter Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing].
100. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 5.
101. See Bagaric, (Marginal) General Deterrence, supra note 79, at 270, 283.
102. Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The
Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 501 (2009).
103. Brian Evans, A Clear Scientific Consensus That the Death Penalty Does NOT Deter,
AMNESTY INT’L (June 18, 2009), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/a-clear-scientific-consensus-thatthe-death-penalty-does-not-deter/ [http://perma.cc/QR3S-5BEC].
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courts continue to fanatically use marginal general deterrence as a rationale for
setting high penalties. This again highlights the disconnect in sentencing
between fact and fiction.
It follows that based on the existing empirical data, the goal of
incapacitation should be pursued more sparingly, specific deterrence and
marginal general deterrence should be abolished as sentencing objectives, and
rehabilitation should not influence sentencing outcomes unless and until it is
demonstrated that it is possible to reform offenders while at the same time
imposing hardships on them.104
The biggest mistake by the Sentencing Commission is the failure to apply
the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality in its most
basic, and persuasive, form requires that the seriousness of the crime be
matched by the harshness of the penalty.105 A jurisdiction in which
proportionality is prominent is Australia. A clear statement of the principle of
proportionality is found in the Australian High Court case of Hoare v The
Queen: “[A] basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of
imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be
justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered
in light of its objective circumstances.”106
107

108

In Veen (No 1) v [The Queen] and Veen (No 2) v [The Queen], the High
Court of Australia stated that proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing.
It is considered so important that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of
community protection, which at various times has also been declared as the
109
most important aim of sentencing.

Thus, in the case of dangerous offenders, while community protection remains
an important objective, at common law it cannot override the principle of
proportionality. Proportionality has been given statutory recognition in all
Australian jurisdictions.110

104. MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 128 (2001)
(at the philosophical level, the act of state-imposed punishment is justified because, as noted
above, absolute general deterrence theory is valid).
105. See Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 MELB. U. L. REV.
489, 492 (1994).
106. Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (Austl.).
107. Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, 468 (Austl.).
108. Veen v The Queen [No. 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Austl.).
109. Mirko Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing: The Need to Factor in Community
Experience, Not Public Opinion, in POPULAR PUNISHMENT: ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE
OF PUBLIC OPINION 78 (Jesper Ryberg & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bagaric,
Proportionality in Sentencing]; see, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 20 ALR 1, 7 (Austl.).
110. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a), 5(2)(c), 5(2)(d) (Austl.) (providing that one of the
purposes of sentencing is to impose a just punishment, and that in sentencing an offender the
court must have regard to the gravity of the offense, and the offender’s culpability and degree of
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Proportionality is also a requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten states
in the United States,111 and one of the few core sentencing principles that is
adopted by both retributive and (some) utilitarian philosophers.112 As noted
above, it is also a core principle that informs (though it does not direct) the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.113
However, the reality is that proportionality exists in the abstract only:
devoid of even the sparsest of detail. Its illusory nature and the unwillingness
or incapacity of sentencing authorities to inject content into the principle, and
to make it the lynchpin of determining sentence length and type is the
fundamental reason for the unsatisfactory state of sentencing law and
practice.114
The United States Supreme Court first considered proportionality under the
Eighth Amendment in the case of Weems.115 The Court noted:

responsibility); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1) (Austl.) (stating that the sentence must be
commensurate with the seriousness of the offense); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s
7(1)(a) (Austl.) (providing that the sentence must be just and appropriate); Sentencing Act 1995
(NT) s 5(1)(a) (Austl.) (providing that the punishment imposed on the offender must be just in all
the circumstances); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a) (Austl.) (stating that the
punishment imposed on the offender must be “just in all the circumstances”); Criminal Law
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(j) (Austl.) (stating that the emphasis is upon ensuring that
“the defendant is adequately punished for the offense”); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k)
(Austl.) (providing that the need for a sentencing court to adequately punish the offender is also
fundamental to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth matters); Crimes Sentencing
Procedure Act 1999 (NSW) pt 1 s 3A(a) (Austl.) (stating that adequate punishment is
fundamental to sentencing).
111. See Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 241, 250 (2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois, Oregon, Washington,
and West Virginia).
112. See Jami L. Anderson, Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism, 16 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 13, 23 (1997); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 11–12 (1985) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH,
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES]; JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A
CRITICAL INVESTIGATION 5 (2004); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 165 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); Paul H. Robinson &
Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832
(2007); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1110 (2011).
113. See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 23.
114. Cf. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038
(2009) (“[O]wing to the ways in which people do and do not adapt to various hardships, our
current methods of punishment may be too blunt to fashion proportional punishments.”).
115. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). The Court’s description of offender’s
punishment:
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a
chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from
friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no
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“[T]he earliest application of the provision in England was in 1689, the
first year after the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1688, to avoid an excessive
pecuniary fine imposed upon Lord Devonshire by the court of King’s Bench.”
Lord Devonshire was fined thirty thousand pounds for an assault and battery
upon Colonel Culpepper, and the House of Lords, in reviewing the case, took
the opinion of the law Lords, and decided that the fine “was excessive and
exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and the law
116
of the land.”

Justice McKenna, who wrote the opinion of the Court, was of the view that it is
“a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense.”117 The Court held that the punishment violated the
Eighth Amendment because of the excess of imprisonment and the
“accessories.”118 The idea of proportionality as a component of the Eighth
Amendment continued with California v. Robinson, where the Court explained
that it “cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”119

participation even in the family council. These parts of his penalty endure for the term of
imprisonment. From other parts, there is no intermission. His prison bars and chains are
removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of
his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice
and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving
notice to the “authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,” and without
permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to
retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as
much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty.
Id.
116. Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983)
(Justice Powell quoted from a House of Lords decision) (“‘[F]ine of thirty thousand pounds,
imposed by the court of King’s Bench upon the earl of Devon was excessive and exorbitant,
against magna charta, the common right of the subject, and the law of the land.’ Earl of Devon’s
Case, 11 State Tr. 133, 136 (1689).”).
117. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367 (“Is this also a precept of the fundamental law? We say
fundamental law, for the provision of the Philippine bill of rights, prohibiting the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the United States and must
have the same meaning.”).
118. Id. at 358, 377; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 992–93 (1991) (Justice Scalia’s
explanation of Weems) (“If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, however, it is hard to view
Weems as announcing a constitutional requirement of proportionality, given that it did not
produce a decision implementing such a requirement, either here or in the lower federal courts,
for six decades. . . . Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals were equally devoid of evidence
that this Court had announced a general proportionality principle. Some evaluated ‘cruel and
unusual punishment’ claims without reference to Weems. . . . Not until more than half a century
after Weems did the Circuit Courts begin performing proportionality analysis.”).
119. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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The Eight Amendment’s proportionality principle was elaborated in Solem
v. Helm.120 In that case, the offender had been punished with imprisonment for
life without parole for the crime of uttering a no-account check.121 The actual
sentence for the crime was five years imprisonment and a fine of $5000, but,
based on South Dakota’s recidivist statute, Helm’s punishment was ratcheted
up to the level described above.122 Justice Powell writing the majority opinion
noted that “[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.
In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were devoted to the rule that
‘amercements’ may not be excessive.”123 He rejected the State's contention that
proportionality does not apply to imprisonment pointing out that:
The constitutional language itself suggests no exception for imprisonment. We
have recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes “parallel limitations” on
bail, fines, and other punishments. . . . It would be anomalous indeed if the
lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were both
subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of
imprisonment were not. There is also no historical support for such an
exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth
124
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.

The Court went on to hold:
[C]ourt's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
125
crime in other jurisdictions.

According to Justice Powell, the first element could be evaluated using
“widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes,” the fact that
120. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285.
121. Id. at 281–82.
122. Id. at 281.
123. Id. at 284.
124. Id. at 288–89.
125. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989–90 (1991). Justice
Scalia concedes that the third element could be applied with “clarity and ease” but dismisses it as
irrelevant:
That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with
the mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may
criminalize an act that other States do not criminalize at all. Indeed, a State may
criminalize an act that other States choose to reward—punishing, for example, the killing
of endangered wild animals for which other States are offering a bounty. What greater
disproportion could there be than that? “Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity
inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of
treating particular offenders more severely than any other State.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
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“nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the
threat of violence,” and by reference to “accepted principles” utilized by courts
to assess the “harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.”126 “The
absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant,” recognizing that the “lesser
included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater
offense,” that “attempts are less serious than completed crimes,” and that “an
accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the
principal.”127 The Court accepted that in order to apply its test, a court would
have to compare prison terms:
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering,
but one of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally is more
severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to decide
that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not.
128
Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.

Applying its objective criteria, the Court found that the punishment imposed
on Helm violated the Eighth Amendment.129
126. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292–93; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988. This first element was
severely attacked by Justice Scalia in Harmelin:
[W]hether it is a “grave” offense merely to possess a significant quantity of drugs—
thereby facilitating distribution, subjecting the holder to the temptation of distribution,
and raising the possibility of theft by others who might distribute—depends entirely upon
how odious and socially threatening one believes drug use to be. Would it be “grossly
excessive” to provide life imprisonment for “mere possession” of a certain quantity of
heavy weaponry? If not, then the only issue is whether the possible dissemination of drugs
can be as “grave” as the possible dissemination of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no?
The members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the streets
of Detroit.
Id.
127. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293.
128. Id. at 294; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988–89. Justice Scalia undermined this reasoning:
One cannot compare the sentences imposed by the jurisdiction for “similarly grave”
offenses if there is no objective standard of gravity. Judges will be comparing what they
consider comparable. Or, to put the same point differently: When it happens that two
offenses judicially determined to be “similarly grave” receive significantly dissimilar
penalties, what follows is not that the harsher penalty is unconstitutional, but merely that
the legislature does not share the judges’ view that the offenses are similarly grave.
Moreover, even if “similarly grave” crimes could be identified, the penalties for them
would not necessarily be comparable, since there are many other justifications for a
difference. For example, since deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the
penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to
detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.
Id. (emphasis in original).
129. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. The Court wrote:
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm’s sentence to determine if it is
proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the
penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more
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Matters got interesting in Harmelin v. Michigan, where Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court was scathing about the reasoning in Solem.130 Engaging
in an extensive historical analysis, he wrote:
[W]e think it most unlikely that the English Cruell and Unusuall Punishments
Clause was meant to forbid “disproportionate” punishments. There is even less
likelihood that proportionality of punishment was one of the traditional “rights
and privileges of Englishmen” apart from the Declaration of Rights, which
131
happened to be included in the Eighth Amendment.

For Scalia, “to use the phrase ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ to describe a
requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying more
directly.” He relied upon the fact that proportionality was not unknown to
Americans of the time, and the drafters had chosen not to incorporate the
requirement specifically although they could have done so.132 In his view, the
proscription was about the modes of punishment and not disproportionality.133
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, finding that the
Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”134
According to the justice, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” He opined that a
court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided
harshly than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has
been treated more harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the
possible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence is significantly
disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Id.
130. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
131. Id. at 974.
132. Id. at 977. (“In 1778, for example, the Virginia Legislature narrowly rejected a
comprehensive ‘Bill for Proportioning Punishments’ introduced by Thomas Jefferson.
Proportionality provisions had been included in several State Constitutions. There is little doubt
that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of Rights were aware of such provisions,
yet chose not to replicate them.” (internal citations omitted)).
133. Id. at 979. Justice Scalia wrote:
While there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable
judges to determine which modes of punishment are “cruel and unusual,” proportionality
does not lend itself to such analysis. Neither Congress nor any state legislature has ever
set out with the objective of crafting a penalty that is “disproportionate”; yet as some of
the examples mentioned above indicate, many enacted dispositions seem to be so—
because they were made for other times or other places, with different social attitudes,
different criminal epidemics, different public fears, and different prevailing theories of
penology. This is not to say that there are no absolutes; one can imagine extreme
examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept.
Id. 985 (emphasis in original).
134. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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by objective criteria, including the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty;135 the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.136
This confusing state of affairs received fresh attention in Ewing v.
California, where the Court affirmed the Harmelin test and reiterated the
narrow proportionality principle contained in the Eighth Amendment.137
Justice O’Connor elaborated on the application of the test to the facts:
In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales
not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any
other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments
that find expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions. In imposing a three
strikes sentence, the State’s interest is not merely punishing the offense of
conviction, or the “triggering” offense: “[I]t is in addition the interest . . . in
dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have
shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as
established by its criminal law.” To give full effect to the State’s choice of this
legitimate penological goal, our proportionality review of Ewing’s sentence
138
must take that goal into account.

The Court noted that “Ewing’s is not ‘the rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality,’” and held that a sentence of twenty-five
years for stealing three golf clubs was not grossly disproportionate.139

135. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000–01, 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (For Justice Kennedy,
“intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality”).
136. Id. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy wrote:
Although Solem considered these comparative factors after analyzing “the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty,” it did not announce a rigid three-part test. In
fact, Solem stated that in determining unconstitutional disproportionality, “no one factor
will be dispositive in a given case.” . . . Solem is best understood as holding that
comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is not always relevant to
proportionality review. The Court stated that “it may be helpful to compare sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,” and that “courts may find it useful to
compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”
It did not mandate such inquiries.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
137. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 11–12, 20 (2003).
138. Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted).
139. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). This was a case under California’s three-strikes law.
Ewing, a parolee, stole three golf clubs worth about $400 each and was sentenced to twenty-five
years to life under the law. Id. at 11.
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Justice Scalia was unimpressed and his dissent was scathing:
Proportionality . . . is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution. “[I]t becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of
‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant
weight,” not to mention giving weight to the purpose of California’s three
strikes law: incapacitation. In the present case, the game is up once the
plurality has acknowledged that “the Constitution does not mandate adoption
of any one penological theory,” and that a “sentence can have a variety of
justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
140
rehabilitation.”

He went on to destroy the plurality’s reasoning:
Having completed [the first step of its test] (by a discussion which, in all
fairness, does not convincingly establish that 25-years-to-life is a
“proportionate” punishment for stealing three golf clubs), the plurality must
then add an analysis to show that “Ewing’s sentence is justified by the State’s
141
public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.”

Justice Scalia correctly pointed out that under the plurality’s explanation, the
Court is not actually undertaking a proportionality analysis but reading in a
requirement that “all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple
purposes of the criminal law.”142 The majority’s inability to sustain its holding
that twenty-five years’ imprisonment is a proportionate punishment for stealing
three golf clubs on any intelligible logic illustrates the current state of judicial
understanding of the concept.
In many respects, this case illustrates the problem with the test: it has
essentially collapsed into just the first limb.143 Courts rarely find that there is
disproportionality between the gravity of the crime and the harshness of the
punishment, meaning that there is no need to examine sentences imposed on
other criminals or compare against sentences in other jurisdictions.144
140. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting “why that has anything to do with the
principle of proportionality is a mystery”).
142. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In light of
the gravity of petitioner’s offense, a comparison of his crime with his sentence does not give rise
to an inference of gross disproportionality, and comparative analysis of his sentence with others
in Michigan and across the Nation need not be performed.”). Justice Kennedy wrote that
“[p]ossession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent ‘one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population.’ Petitioner’s suggestion that his crime was
nonviolent and victimless is false to the point of absurdity. To the contrary, petitioner’s crime
threatened to cause grave harm to society.” Id. at 1002 (internal citations omitted).
144. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 88 (2010) (in evaluating this limb, the “analysis can
consider a particular offender’s mental state and motive in committing the crime, the actual harm
caused to his victim or to society by his conduct, and any prior criminal history.” Other factors
are “past criminal conduct, alcoholism, and propensity for violence of the particular defendant” as
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[T]he main elements of [the principle] are so indeterminate that they are
incapable of providing meaningful guidance to sentencing courts [or
legislatures]. There are no established criteria by which the severity of an
offence is evaluated. It is accepted that the pain suffered by the victim of the
crime is an important consideration. However, there is no existing
methodology for measuring victim suffering. [The principle] is further clouded
by the uncertainty regarding whether other variables, such as the offender’s
prior criminal history, should be incorporated into the principle. The
uncertainty of the principle is also compounded by the fact that there is no
common standard which can be used to match sanction hardship with offence
145
gravity.

The vagaries are so pronounced that it is verging on doctrinal and intellectual
fiction to suggest that an objective answer can be given to common sentencing
dilemmas, such as how many years imprisonment is equivalent to the pain felt
by an assault victim; or whether a burglar should be dealt with by way of
imprisonment or fine; or the appropriate sanction for a drug trafficker.
Certainly, there is no demonstrable violation of proportionality if a mugger,
robber, or drug trafficker is sentenced to either twelve months’ or twelve years’
imprisonment. The fact that the principle can be so flexible leads to the
suspicion that it is no principle at all and is simply an expedient that is invoked
by courts (and legislatures) as a means to justify their intuitive sentencing
impulse.
One commentator writes:
A number of state courts have examined factors similar to those that the
U.S. Supreme Court identified in Solem—the gravity of the offense and
severity of the punishment; the sentences imposed for other crimes in the same
jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. Two states—Illinois and California—now appear to have
abandoned the second Solem factor and no longer attempt to compare
sentences imposed for unrelated crimes as part of deciding proportionality
146
challenges.

We now explore the principle in greater detail and suggest how it can be
developed into a coherent and concrete concept.

well as “specific details of the particular crime of conviction”); United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d
1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e are certain that we cannot conclude that the sentence is
grossly disproportionate when the defendant had twice before been convicted of a serious violent
felony.”).
145. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 79–80.
146. Balmer, supra note 7, at 811.
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IV. DEVELOPING CONTENT INTO PROPORTIONALITY AS A BASIS FOR FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
The key aspect of the principle is that [proportionality] has two limbs. The first
is the seriousness of the crime, and the second is the harshness of the sanction.
Further, the principle has a quantitative component—the two limbs must be
matched. For the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be
147
equal to the harshness of the penalty.

Before analyzing these two components in greater detail, we briefly discuss
two forms of proportionality that have been advanced.148
A.

Cardinal and Ordinal Proportionality

It has been suggested that there are two forms of proportionality. “The first
is ordinal proportionality, which concerns how offenders are punished relative
to each other. It focuses on the relative seriousness of offenses and comes
down to the view that offenders who commit graver offenses should receive
sterner penalties.”149 More fully, von Hirsch states that it has three features:
parity, which requires that similar crimes deserve similar penalties;150 ranking
order, which means that more severe crimes are accorded more severe
sanctions; and the last requirement concerns spacing of penalties and provides
that the space between the seriousness of penalties should be commensurate
with the difference in the seriousness of the offense.151
In order for the scaling to commence, a starting point is needed. This is
determined by selecting a particular crime or crimes152 (benchmark crimes)
and setting an appropriate sanction. Sanctions are then selected for all other
crimes by comparing their seriousness with the benchmark crime and adjusting
the penalty up or down accordingly. This process of anchoring the penalty
scale is termed “cardinal proportionality.”
Von Hirsch believes that cardinal proportionality is not absolute; it is a
convention.153 It too is essentially a relative concept; however, at the extremes
there is a limit to the level of punishment, which can be imposed. “If suitable
147. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 77–78.
148. The examination of the proportionality principle below is derived from Mirko Bagaric,
Injecting Content Into the Mirage That Is Proportionality in Sentencing, 25 N.Z. U. L. REV. 411,
424 (2013).
149. Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed
Penalties, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, ¶ 72 (2002) (emphasis added).
150. Except in the case of relevant prior convictions. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND
SANCTIONS 60 (1993) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS].
151. He concedes that this is a matter upon which there is unlikely to be much exactness. VON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 112, at 45.
152. Id. at 43. There is no specific crime, which should obviously be the starting point.
153. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT
112, 129 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994).
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reasons can be established for objecting to [a] convention (for example, on
grounds that it depreciates the importance of the rights of those convicted of
. . . low-ranking crimes[]) . . . a non-relative constraint is established.”154 This
serves to anchor the penalty scale. In earlier writings, von Hirsch states that
cardinal proportionality may be breached where the sanction “fails to accord
respect to the person punished,”155 or where it “denigrates the importance of
the defendant’s right to liberty.”156
This anchoring point, however, is not absolute in the true sense. It is only
absolute within the legal system under consideration since different
jurisdictions have different starting points, which are generally determined
without considered reflection, but are merely accepted as being intuitively
correct.157 This is a point accepted by von Hirsch (and Ashworth) in his more
recent writings.158
The distinction between ordinal and cardinal proportionality must be
treated with some caution. While it is not illusory, it does not provide a
meaningful distinction in terms of giving substance to the proportionality
principle. All the hard work remains to be done.159 The starting point is that the
gravity of an offense depends on its seriousness, where seriousness is gauged
on the basis of certain (albeit yet to be determined) criteria. Application of this
standard to each offense will determine the seriousness of the offense.
Logically, this task can be undertaken without one eye being kept on how other
offenses have been graded in the same way that one grades mathematics
papers: two times two is four, irrespective of what the other papers say.
Ordinal proportionality is no more than an appeal to internal consistency,
which requires that the graver offenses are not treated less seriously than the
comparatively more minor offenses. Thus, for example, murder must be treated

154. Id.; see also VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS, supra note 150, at 45 (making
essentially the same point).
155. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 112, at 44 (emphasis added).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 70 (4th ed. 2005)
(noting that differing demographics and differing availability of “stealable” goods might cause
differing crime rates and sentencing in different areas).
158. ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 143 (2005) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING] (“How much guidance will our model give? Admittedly, it would
provide only a limited degree of guidance on the setting of the penalty system’s anchoring
points—that is, the system’s overall degree of punitiveness. But the model tells one considerably
more (albeit not providing unique solutions) about the comparative scaling of penalties: about
punishing equally reprehensible conduct approximately equally, and about scaling unequally
serious conduct according to the conduct’s differing degree of seriousness.”).
159. In particular, the assertion that ordinal proportionality is all that is necessary is unsound.
As noted by Jesper Ryberg, it logically permits for harsh punishments for minor offenses and soft
punishments for serious offenses. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 148.
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more harshly than robbery, which in turn must be punished more severely than
theft. However, this appeal to consistency is not a defining characteristic of
proportionality. It is merely an incidental feature that will follow if the
seriousness of each offense is ranked properly according to the same indicia—
to avoid circularity, one of the criteria for determining offense severity cannot
include existing penalties.
Beyond this, ordinal proportionality may be used to act as a check on the
outcome of applying the relevant indicia to each offense. If the result of such
an analysis reveals disturbing rankings, for example, if it transpired that theft
was more serious than murder, this breach of ordinal proportionality would
suggest that the factors supposedly governing cardinal proportionality are
incorrect or wrongly applied. However, this is not to set ordinal proportionality
as a discrete, defining requirement of proportionality. It is merely to recognize
it is a by-product of a correct application of the appropriate variables relevant
to cardinal proportionality and a tool that may be used to loosely check
estimates of cardinal proportionality.
The most controversial aspect of von Hirsch’s analysis of cardinal
proportionality is his claim that it is a relative concept. Although, the
importance of certain interests vary across (and sometimes within) cultures, it
may yet be possible to identify a sufficiently pervasive human concern or
interest, which is sensitive to such variations, and, in this way, an objective
formula for offense seriousness may be determined. This idea is developed
below.
As we adverted to earlier, the enthusiasm for the principle of
proportionality is not matched by its clarity. The key concept for
proportionality is the objective seriousness of the offense; however, this
concept is so vague that it dilutes the principle to practical nothingness. In
order for proportionality to be of pragmatic guidance, it is necessary to give
some content to the factors that are relevant to the gravity of the offense. After
this, the commensurability between the offense and sanction is examined.
B.

Factors Relevant to the Seriousness of the Offense

The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect of proportionality is that there
is no stable and clear manner in which the punishment can be matched to the
crime.160 As noted by Jesper Ryberg, one of the key criticisms of the theory is
that it “presupposes something which is not there, namely, some objective
measure of appropriateness between crime and punishment.”161 As he further

160. As noted in Part II of this Article, the courts have not attempted to exhaustively define
the factors that are relevant to proportionality. See supra Part II.
161. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 184.
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notes, to give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank crimes, rank
punishments, and anchor the scales.162
“This is a challenge noted by numerous scholars.”163 In relation to the first
limb (at least), however, it has been noted that some approaches have been
applied.164 Yet in a pragmatic sense, the problem is not insurmountable.165
Legislatures commonly set maximum penalties for offenses, and this is a crude
method for ranking offense seriousness.166 “While the maximum penalty is not
a defining criterion regarding the sanction in any particular case, even when it
comes to precisely prescribing a predetermined sanction for an offense type,
this has often been undertaken with little difficulty.”167
However, the fact that agreement can and has been reached regarding the
seriousness of certain crimes (whether by government institutions or within the
general community)168 does not justify the outcome.169 A doctrinally sound
approach is needed to define the criteria by which offense severity is defined.
It is to this that we now turn.170

162. Id. at 185.
163. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 84.
164. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 143
(“How is crime-seriousness to be assessed? Ordinary people, various opinion surveys have
suggested, seem capable of reaching a degree of agreement on the comparative seriousness of
criminal offences.”). Moreover, there seems to be a relatively high degree of consensus in relation
to this. For an overview of Robinson’s approach, see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban,
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Paul H.
Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime,
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment
Theory]. But for a counter to this, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein,
Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77 (2013).
165. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 84.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at
143–44 (“The rulemaking bodies that have tried to rank crimes in gravity have not run into
insuperable practical difficulties, moreover. Several US state sentencing commissions (including
those of Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon) were able to rank the seriousness of offenses for
use in their numerical guidelines. While the grading task proved time-consuming, it did not
generate much dissension within these rule-making bodies.”).
168. Courts sometimes factor community sentiment into an assessment of offense severity.
E.g., WCB v R [2010] VSCA 230 (Austl.); Stalio v The Queen [2012] VSCA 120 (Austl.).
169. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 60. (“Even if it is correct that there is general agreement
between people as to how the seriousness of different crimes should be rated, this does not of
itself show that the rating should be morally accepted. This would require an independent
argument. Moreover, it is generally agreed that there might be a divergence between popular
judgements and what is morally well-grounded. The need for a theoretical enquiry clarifying what
is morally relevant in the comparison of crimes is, therefore generally acknowledged among
proportionalists.”).
170. The approach below is similar in approach to the notion of “empirical desert” advanced
by Robinson, but we adapt different criteria for informing the content of the principle. For an
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The Living Standard Approach

One of the most comprehensive examinations of the factors relevant to
proportionality has been undertaken in the context of the “living standard”
approach to proportionality. This was first advanced by Andrew von Hirsch
and Nils Jareborg and refined more than a decade later by von Hirsch and
Andrew Ashworth. [Andrew] von Hirsch and [Nils] Jareborg start with the
assumption that the seriousness of a crime has two dimensions: harm and
culpability. Harm refers to the injury done or risked by the act; culpability to
the factors of intent, motive and circumstances that determine the extent to
171
which the offender should be held accountable for the act.
In relation to the culpability component, [they] import substantive criminal
law doctrines of culpability such as intention, recklessness, and negligence and
172
excuses such as provocation into the sentencing stage. But they contend that
such an approach is not possible with respect to harm, where they claim that
“virtually no legal doctrines have been developed on how the gravity of harms
173
can be compared.” Thus, the focus of their inquiry is giving content to the
174
harm component.
[They] approach this task by considering the seriousness of an offense
against a background of important human concerns, and confine their analysis
to conduct that is (already) criminal and injures or threatens identifiable
175
victims. Aggravating or mitigating considerations are not addressed due to
the complexity that this would import. In a bid to gauge the level of harm
caused by an offence, the starting point for von Hirsch and Jareborg is to use a
broad-based “living standard” criterion where the gravity of criminal harm is
determined “by the importance that the relevant interests have for a person’s
176
standard of living.”
The living standard focuses “on the means or
capabilities for achieving a certain quality of life,” rather than actual life
177
quality or goal achievement,
and is adapted from the criteria set out by
178
Amartya Sen, which encompasses non-economic and economic interests.

overview of Robinson’s approach, see Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory,
supra note 164; Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 164.
171. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87; Andrew von Hirsch &
Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 2–3 (1991) [hereinafter von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm].
172. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 3.
173. Id.
174. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87.
175. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 3.
176. Id. at 12.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87; VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 144.
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They formulate four living standard levels, which are used to determine the
179
degree to which a particular crime affects a person’s living standard.
The
most important is subsistence, which equates to survival with no more than
basic capacities to function and then follows minimal well-being and adequate
well-being, which mean maintenance of a minimum and adequate level of
comfort and dignity, respectively. Finally, there is enhanced well-being, which
180
is defined as significant enhancement of quality of life. The most grievous
harms are those which most drastically diminish one’s standard of well181
being. Thus, a crime which violates the first level (subsistence) is the most
serious, whereas one which infringes only enhanced well-being is the least
182
serious.
Next, they determine the type of interests which are violated or threatened
by the paradigm instances of particular offenses. They identify four basic types
of interests. In descending order they are physical integrity, material support
and amenity (ranging from nutrition and shelter to various luxuries), freedom
183
from humiliating or degrading treatment, and privacy and autonomy. Some
interest dimensions such as physical integrity are applicable to all of the grades
on the living-standard scale, depending on the level of intrusion, whereas other
interests such as privacy and autonomy are confined to levels including and
184
below minimum well-being.
After the interest violated by the typical
instance of a particular offense is ascertained the effect on the living standard
185
is then determined.

For example, in the case of a stock-in-trade burglary, physical integrity is not
affected, and, assuming the item stolen is inexpensive and easily replaceable,
material amenity is also scarcely affected. Privacy is more significantly
affected; hence, on the living standard, it ranks at level four (as affecting
enhanced well-being).186
After the harm scale score is determined, discounts are accorded where
crimes create only a risk or threat to a particular interest: the remoter the risk or
less likely the threat, the greater the discount.187 As such, attempted offenses

179. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 17.
180. These grades are further elaborated at von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm,
supra note 171, at 17–19. They make the obvious point that there will be variations within the
four grades.
181. See id. at 17.
182. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88.
183. For an elaboration of these concepts, see von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal
Harm, supra note 171, at 19–21. In later analysis, autonomy and freedom from degrading
treatment are not mentioned.
184. Id. at 21.
185. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88; von Hirsch & Jareborg,
Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 20.
186. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 27.
187. Id. at 30.
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are regarded as being less serious than completed ones. Von Hirsch and
Jareborg do not address at length the issue of culpability but suggest that
discounts should also be given for less blameworthy states of mind.188 Thus,
harm caused, say, negligently, does not rate as high as when it is caused
intentionally.
In a nutshell, the argument is that the seriousness of an offense is gauged
by the impact that the crime has on the living standard of the typical victim.189
The approach is made more appealing by the fact that it applies to
standardized measures for a good life, as opposed to that which is applicable to
a particular victim.190 A further advantage of the theory is that the same
principal variables can also be used to assess sanction severity. Thus, as noted
by von Hirsch and Ashworth: “Imprisonment thus qualifies as a severe penalty,
because the interests in freedom of movement and privacy it takes away are
normally so vital to a good existence.”191
To determine the seriousness of a crime, a logical starting point is to assess
the level of detriment inflicted, where the level of detriment is viewed from the
perspective of important human concerns. Von Hirsch and Jareborg identify
what they regard as important human concerns and also go about ranking
them—as they must do—to give some content to their formulation.192 The
problem, however, with their ranking system is that, despite conceding that
their analysis is normative, “since it is a theory on how harms ought to be
rated,193 it is devoid of an underlying rationale or an empirical or scientific
foundation—it is built on armchair speculation.”194
Intuition aside, we are not told why privacy and autonomy are any less
important than, say, freedom from humiliation. In order to determine such
issues, an underlying moral and scientific theory is needed.
Von Hirsch and Jareborg accept the need for a moral theory, however, they are
content to rest their case on the basis that an “articulated moral theory”

188. Id. at 3. They accept that the substantive criminal law doctrines of culpability may be
“drawn upon” at sentencing stage, and they imply that their analysis is sufficiently sensitive to
compare harm caused intentionally as opposed to negligently.
189. Id. at 33.
190. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 146.
191. Id. at 148. But it does not apply so clearly to other sanctions:
There remain, however, certain practical problems of applying an interest analysis
approach to gauging the severity of sanctions: the exercise is much easier for terms of
imprisonment and for financial penalties than it is for community penalties and other noncustodial measures, which can vary so much in their conditions and in the extent of their
restrictions on liberty.
Id.
192. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 17–18.
193. Id. at 5–6.
194. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88.
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underpinning the living standard is beyond the scope of their discussion.
They go on to state that they are “not trying to develop an invariant harmanalysis but, instead to derive ratings applicable here, given certain prevailing
196
social practices and also certain ethical traditions.”
Some of the social
practices they assume are spelled out, such as the social convention that home
is important for a comfortable existence. However, the detail we are not given
197
is which “ethical traditions” have been assumed.
[They] state that the living standard for gauging harm is used because “it
198
Further, the “living
appears to fit the way one ordinarily judges harms.”
standard provides, not a generalized ethical norm, but a useful standard which
199
the law can use in gauging the harmfulness of criminal acts.” This, however,
200
raises the questions: useful in what sense? And how useful?

Any standard is useful because it will at least assist in achieving uniformity in
sentencing. However, a standard based on spiritual or purely economic wellbeing will also achieve that. Von Hirsch and Jareborg attempt (unpersuasively)
to turn the criticism that their theory lacks a justification into an advantage:
“The living standard approach also has the advantage of a certain modesty; no
‘deep’ theory of preferred life-aims or appropriate social roles is
presupposed.”201
The selection and adoption of certain harms in preference to others can
only be justified by reference to an underlying moral and social theory, which
is informed by empirical data. To this end, an obvious candidate is
utilitarianism, which offers a simple method for determining the types of
interests that are relevant to harm seriousness: The reason that some interests
are important and worthy of protection by the criminal law is because they are
integral to the attainment of happiness. In fact, the approach adopted (and
conclusions reached) by von Hirsch and Jareborg have much in common with
202
a transparently utilitarian evaluation of harm analysis.

The considerations they identify seem to map well onto a (tenable) utilitarian
scale of the primacy of interests relevant to happiness. For example, it is
feasible to suggest that the most essential requirement to the attainment of any
degree of meaningful happiness is physical integrity and subsistence, followed
by material support and minimal well-being, and so on. The next thing many
seem to value most is material support. Freedom from humiliation and privacy

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 15.
Id. (emphasis added).
Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88.
Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 11.
Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).
Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88.
Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 12.
Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88–89.
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and autonomy, though not necessarily in that order, are seen to be important
interests towards the road to happiness.
2.

Studies Measuring the Variables Relevant to Happiness and Moving
from “Happiness” to “Well-Being” as a Standard Measure

A more doctrinally consistent manner to gauge the seriousness of harm is
to adopt a utilitarian primary rationale and then to prescribe weight to defined
interests in accordance with empirical observations [about the interests that are
valued most highly]. The potential disadvantage of this approach is that the
notion of happiness is inherently vague. However, over the past few decades
there has been an increase in the number of studies conducted into human
happiness and well-being. Happiness has become a scientific rather than a
purely theoretical concept. The overriding pursuit of happiness is now
increasingly a psychological truism rather than an obscure aspirational
objective. There is now a dedicated international journal (the Journal of
Happiness Studies) which is devoted to articles [based on empirical studies of]
203
what makes people happy (or indeed unhappy). Over the last few years there
has been a number of important works looking at what makes people happy
and, in particular, looking at whether there is a positive or negative correlation
204
between happiness and wealth creation.
While noting the diversity in the range of activities through which people
choose to express themselves, the studies show that basically we are not that
different after all. At the core, humans are wired pretty much the same. While
some people prefer singing in a choir as opposed to boxing in a ring and others
prefer repairing motor vehicles to writing poetry, we should not allow these
superficial differences to divert us from the fact that we have the same basal
205
needs and our well-being is promoted by the same type of things.

203. JOURNAL OF HAPPINESS STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FORUM OF SUBJECTIVE
WELL-BEING, http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/wellbeing+%26+quality-of-life/journal/
10902 [http://perma.cc/KC6D-EAB7] (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
204. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; see, e.g., Claudia Wallis et
al., The New Science of Happiness, TIME, Jan. 17, 2005 (devoting the entire issue to this topic).
205. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; This is the trend of
information emerging from the following works and extensive research data in these works:
MICHAEL ARGYLE ET AL., Happiness as a Function of Personality and Social Encounters, in
RECENT ADVANCES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189 (Joseph P.
Forgas & J. Michael Innes eds., 1989); TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM (2002);
DAVID G. MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: DISCOVERING THE PATHWAY TO FULFILLMENT,
WELL-BEING, AND ENDURING PERSONAL JOY (1992); Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, Positive Psychology: An Introduction, 55 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2000);
MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO
REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2002).
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The studies indicate that we can now, with a growing degree of
206
confidence, identify the things that make people happy.
People have the
same basic wants and needs. In a nutshell, the things that are conducive to
happiness are fit and healthy bodies, realistic goals, self-esteem, optimism, an
outgoing personality, a sense of control, close relationships, challenging work,
and active leisure, punctuated by adequate rest and a faith that entails
communal support, purpose, and acceptance. Myths about happiness include
207
that it is bought by money and that religious faith suppresses happiness.
However, the relevant studies have not been conducted with a view to
providing insight into calculations of offence seriousness or sanction severity.
Nevertheless, a number of tentative conclusions can be made regarding the
208
relevance of the studies to proportionalism.
First, property offences [which deprive victims of a degree of wealth (as
opposed to diminishing their personal security] are . . . overrated in terms of
their seriousness. Wealth has little effect on personal happiness; hence, the
criminal justice system should view these offences less seriously. The only
occasions where property offences make a significant adverse impact on
209
victims is where they result in the victim living in a state of poverty.

This argument is intuitively challenging. This is especially the case where an
offense destroys wealth, which is emotionally important, even though no net
financial loss occurs (for example, where artistic work is destroyed, but
insurance is paid) or when an individual is reduced from high levels of wealth
and resources to a considerably lower level (and hence loses the ability to act
charitably to others). In these situations the studies do not debunk the view that
the victim will not experience considerable unhappiness. First, the studies are
not acute enough to evaluate the impact on well-being of loss of sentimental or
emotional objects. However, the studies firmly establish210 that if a
considerable reduction in well-being does flow from such a loss, it is not
because of deprivation of resources per se, but the incidental deprivations that
stem from this (in the form of emotional separation and inability to confer
generosity).
The second conclusion that follows from the above studies is that:
[O]ffences which imperil a person’s sense of security or otherwise negatively
affect a person’s health and capacity to lead a free and autonomous life should

206. Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming
Positive Psychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005).
207. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; Bagaric & McConvill,
supra note 206, at 17. Also, generally see this edition of the Deakin Law Review, which is a
thematic edition, regarding the link between law and happiness research.
208. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. See RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990);
MYERS, supra note 205, at 36; KASSER, supra note 205, at 9–10.
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be punished severely. These implications are of limited value for informing the
proportionality principle because, as noted above, they do not directly examine
the effects of crime. Further, the studies are not conclusive regarding the
211
criteria that are relevant to happiness.
However, the concept of developing an index of the variables that affect
human prosperity is becoming increasingly mainstream. The indexes, however,
generally use different nomenclature from that conventionally adopted by
utilitarians. The key concept is normally defined as “well-being” as opposed to
“happiness.” It is not clear whether this is a difference in substance. However,
in principle, it is preferable because the notion of well-being appears, at least
intuitively, to relate to enduring (as opposed to transient) traits and hence is
212
likely to have wider appeal.
The concept of well-being is becoming so mainstream that in some
contexts it is replacing or complementing conventional and widely accepted
economic indicia for evaluating human progress and achievement. The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] has
developed a “Better Life Index,” which attempts to set out and prioritise the
213
matters that are most essential for human well-being. The index lists eleven
criteria for measuring life quality that allows nations to develop their priorities
214
and distinguishes between responses from men and women.
It transpires
215
that men and women have near identical priorities. The order from most to
least important is life satisfaction, health, education, work-life balance,
environment, jobs, safety, housing, community, income, and civic
216
engagement.

3.

Studies That Directly Measure the Impact of Crime

Even more relevant to an assessment of the severity of crime are studies
that measure the impact of certain crime offence categories on victims. The
best information available suggests that, typically, victims of violent and
sexual crime suffer considerably and, in fact, more than is manifest from the
217
obvious and direct effects of crime.

The problem with some studies is that they do not distinguish adequately
between different types of crime to determine the relative impact of criminal
offense types. However, the data available suggest that victims of violent crime

211. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90.
212. Id.
213. OECD Better Life Index, OECD, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/#/11111111111
[http://perma.cc/H6GQ-LHA5] (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
214. Id.
215. Although, women rank income less highly and health more highly than men.
216. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90; OECD, supra note 213.
These measures are designed to be more informative than economic statistics, especially in the
form of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
217. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90.
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and sexual crime have their well-being more significantly set back than for
other types of crime.
Rochelle Hanson, Genelle Sawyer, Angela Begle, and Grace Hubel (2010)
reviewed the existing literature regarding the effects of violent and sexual
218
crimes on key quality of life indices. The crimes examined included rape,
sexual assault, aggravated assault, survivors of homicide (i.e. relatives of those
killed), and intimate partner violence. The key quality of life indicia examined
were role function (i.e. capacity to perform in the roles of parenting and
intimate relationships and to function in the social and occupational domains),
reported levels of life satisfaction, and, well-being and social-material
219
conditions (i.e. physical and mental health conditions).
The report
demonstrated that many victims suffered considerably across a range of well220
being indicia, well after the physical signs had passed.
The report
concluded:
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general trauma and
the emerging research on crime victimization indicate significant
functional impact on the quality of life for victims. However, more
research is necessary to understand the mechanisms of these relationships
and differences amongst types of crime victimization, gender, and
221
racial/ethnic groups.
Findings showed that victims of violent crime and sexual crime in
particular have:
 Difficulty in being involved in intimate relationships and far higher
222
divorce rates;
223

 Diminished parenting skills (although this finding was not universal);

 Lower levels of success in the employment setting (especially in relation
to victims who had been abused by their partners) and much higher
224
levels of unemployment;
 Considerable impairment and dysfunction in social and leisure activities,
225
with many victims retreating from conventional social supports; and
 High levels of direct medical costs associated with violent crime (over
226
$US24,353 for an assault requiring hospitalisation).

218. Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 189 (2010).
219. Id. at 190.
220. Id. at 194–95.
221. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 91; Hanson et al., supra note
218, at 194.
222. Hanson et al., supra note 218, at 191.
223. Id. at 190.
224. Id. at 191.
225. Id. at 191–92.
226. Id. at 193; Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 91.
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A study published in 2006, focusing on victims in the United Kingdom, found
that:
 Victims of violent crime were 2.6 times as likely as non-victims to
suffer from depression and 1.8 times as likely to exhibit hostile behavior
227
five years after the original offense; and,
 For fifty-two percent of women who had been seriously sexually
assaulted in their lives, their experience led to either depression or other
emotional problems, and for one in twenty it led to attempted suicide
(64,000 women living in England and Wales today have tried to kill
228
themselves following a serious sexual assault).

Chester L. Britt, in a study examining the effects of either violent or property
crime on the health of 2430 respondents,229 noted: “Victims of violent crime
reported lower levels of perceived health and physical wellbeing, controlling
for measures of injury and for sociodemographic characteristics.”230
These findings were not confined to violent crime. Victims of property
crime also reported reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less
profound than in the case of violent crime.231
4.

The Irrelevance of Other Factors to Crime Severity

The ranking of crime is made complicated by the fact that, typically, it is
thought to involve consideration of both the harm caused by the offence and
the culpability of the offender and, according to some theorists, certain
aggravating and mitigating considerations (and, in particular, the prior
232
criminality of the offender).
There is, however, no principled reason for
233
infusing either of these into an assessment of offence severity.
This variable-rich approach to offence severity is consistent with the
manner in which courts have often interpreted the proportionality principle.
However, it is flawed. There are several problems with allowing factors not
directly related to the offence to have a role in evaluating offence
234
seriousness.

227. MIKE DIXON ET AL., CRIMESHARE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACT OF CRIME 25 (2006).
228. Id. at 17; Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 91.
229. Chester L. Britt, Health Consequences of Criminal Victimization, 8 INT’L REV.
VICTIMOLOGY 63, 65 (2001).
230. Id. at 63.
231. Id. at 69–70; see also Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’
Well-Being and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141,
155–56 (1998). This is not necessarily inconsistent with the findings noted earlier that financial
resources cannot produce happiness. Money and resources are relevant to well-being but are not
cardinal considerations.
232. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 185.
233. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 92.
234. Id.
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First, it is contradictory to claim that the principle of proportionality means
the punishment should be commensurate with the objective seriousness of the
offence and then allow considerations external to the offence to have a role in
determining how much punishment is appropriate. Once the inquiry extends to
matters not even remotely connected with the crime, such as the offender’s
upbringing or previous convictions, the parameters of the offence have been
235
clearly exhausted.
Second, by importing other considerations (especially aggravating and
mitigating factors) into proportionalism, much of the splendour of the principle
of proportionality is dissipated. The principle then cannot be claimed as being
indicative of anything: To ascertain how much to punish, the appealing idea of
looking only at the objective seriousness of the offence is abandoned and the
236
inquiry must move elsewhere—and, indeed, everywhere. Giving content to
the principle of proportionality would become unworkable—as is currently the
case. In each particular sentencing inquiry the principle would need to be
flexible enough to accommodate not only the objective circumstances of the
offence but also the mitigating [and aggravating] circumstances. Given the
uniqueness of each offender’s personal circumstances and the vast number of
variables which are supposedly relevant to such an inquiry and the fact that
mitigating factors often pull in a diametrically opposite direction to the
objective factors relevant to the offence, any attempt to provide a workable
principle of proportionality must fail. It was for this reason that von Hirsch and
Jareborg, when elaborating on the matters that are relevant to gauging the
seriousness of the offence, declined to consider aggravating and mitigating
237
circumstances.

A non-tautologous definition of proportionality would be impossible if the
proportionality principle must accommodate the full range of supposed
sentencing considerations.238
The above analysis provides some guidance regarding measuring offence
seriousness. Further clarity will emerge if the focus on graduating offences
commences with offences that have identifiable victims. Once a degree of
consensus is obtained in that context, assessments should then be made in
relation to offences that have less identifiable and more remote forms of harm,

235. Id. (emphasis in original).
236. As noted below, in Australia there are nearly 300 different aggravating and mitigating
considerations.
237. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 92; von Hirsch & Jareborg,
Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 4.
238. However, as discussed below, there is some scope to overlay the assessment of the
severity of the crime with a relatively small adjustment for the offender’s culpability. See infra
Part IV.
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such as drug and motor traffic offences [and offences that potentially
239
undermine important institutional structures and processes, such as perjury].

5.

Evaluating the Hardship of Sanctions

While there has been some consideration of measuring crime severity,
there has been less attention given to the other side of the proportionality
equation: measuring punishment severity. Ryberg contends this is because of
240
the underlying belief that the “answer is pretty straightforward” —with
imprisonment being clearly the harshest disposition. As Ryberg notes, the
answer would seem to rest on “the negative impact on the well-being of the
241
[punished].”
Von Hirsch and Ashworth (2005) also believe that it is less
complex to rank punishments because the appropriate reference point seems to
242
be the degree of suffering or inconvenience caused to the offender.
Other criteria have been invoked, including community views about the
hardship of a penalty. To this end, a number of opinion surveys have been
243
undertaken.
[W]hile community attitudes are a tool that can be used to assess penalty
severity, they are an inadequate measure because of the lack of practical
knowledge of the survey participants. To this end, the relevant insight can only
244
come from those who have experienced the relevant sanction.
The starting point is to evaluate the adverse impact of imprisonment, given
that it is the harshest sanction and the one which probably has the least amount
of diversity in its application. In all societies it minimally involves physical
confinement. It is surprising how little research has been conducted into the
245
extent to which this sanction actually sets back well-being.

239. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 93. George Fletcher notes the
lesser evident role of proportionality in relation to such offenses:
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in turn requires sensitivity to the
injury inflicted. . . . The more the victim suffers, the more pain should be inflicted on the
criminal. In the context of betrayal, the gears of this basic principle of justice, the lex
talionis, fail to engage the problem. The theory of punishment does not mesh with the
crime when there is no tangible harm, no friction against the physical welfare of the
victim.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993).
However, more accurately, it is not that proportionality has no role in relation to such offenses;
rather, in such cases it must focus on generalizing the harm involved in that type of behavior and
is hence more difficult to apply.
240. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 102.
241. Id. at 102–03
242. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 93; VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 140.
243. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 94; VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 148.
244. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 94.
245. Id.
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The direct adverse impact of prison conditions has been well documented.
And it has been known for several decades that the “pains” of imprisonment
extend far beyond the deprivation of liberty. Other negative consequences of
imprisonment are:
 The deprivation of goods and services;

246

 The deprivation of heterosexual relationships;
248

 The deprivation of autonomy;

247

and

249

 The deprivation of security.

In addition to this, more recent data notes violence continues to be a major
hazard in jail, with a recent survey showing that nearly one-third of state
prisoners reported injuries that were either violence-related or accidental.250
What is less well understood is how these deprivations affect the life
trajectories of prisoners. The evidence available indicates that it has a
considerable negative impact which transcends the actual term of
imprisonment. Imprisonment seems to have an adverse effect on well-being
measures after the conclusion of the sentence, even to the point of significantly
251
reducing life expectancy.
A study which examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners
in the US state of Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners
252
than for the rest of the population. There were 2,650 deaths in total, which
was a 43 per cent higher mortality rate than normally expected (799 more ex253
prisoners died than expected). The main causes for the increased mortality
rates were homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (which
254
included drug overdoses) and suicide.

The period immediately following release is especially precarious for
offenders, with studies showing that in the two weeks following release, ex-

246. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY
PRISON 67, 68 (2007).
247. Id. at 70, 71.
248. Id. at 73.
249. Id. at 76, 77; Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 94; see also
Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction to THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT (Robert Johnson &
Hans Toch eds., 1982).
250. Hung-En Sung, Prevalence and Risk Factors of Violence-Related and Accident-Related
Injuries Among State Prisoners, 16 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 178, 179 (2010).
251. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 95.
252. Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution:
Implications for Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 479, 481–82 (2011); see also
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 220, 226.
253. Spaulding et al., supra note 252, at 482.
254. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 95; Spaulding et al., supra
note 252, at 484. The higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners were consistent with findings in
other reports, which are cited in the Spaulding article. Id.
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prisoners are more than thirteen times more likely to die than people in the
general population.255
Many offenders released from prison continue to have their well-being set
back in more ways than increased mortality rates. A recent New Zealand
study256 showed that post-release offenders displayed vulnerabilities associated
with financial matters, drug temptations, decision-making, and social
interactions.257
Former prisoners without strong social networks were especially
vulnerable and often had difficulty meeting their own basic needs, including
experiencing hunger and homelessness, and being unable to access health
care.258 Imprisonment also has a profoundly negative effect on the families of
prisoners. Married men who have served time in jail are three times more
likely to divorce than those who had not been incarcerated but had been
convicted of an offense,259 and the families of prisoners have higher rates of
homelessness.260 Moreover, studies report that “fathers’ incarceration is
stressful for children, increasing both depression and anxiety as well as
antisocial behavior.”261 Most studies also find that ex-prisoners find it more
difficult to secure employment, and they have also have a considerably lower
rate of lifetime earnings.262
The data, although only cursory, suggests that imprisonment is a more
painful disposition than appears at face value. It is even more complex to make
an assessment of the severity of other sanctions such as probation, community
work orders, and fines because of their variability. But at least, in theory, the
problem is not insurmountable. The severity of sanctions would be evaluated
by reference to their level of “onerousness.” Ryberg uses similar terminology
in suggesting that the answer would seem to rest on “negative impact on the
263
well-being of the [punished].”
This requires the same types of
considerations as those involved in the assessment of the other limb of the
264
proportionality thesis.

255. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 226.
256. MICHAEL ROGUSKI & FLEUR CHAUVEL, THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT ON INMATES’
AND THEIR FAMILIES’ HEALTH AND WELLBEING (Nov. 2009). A limitation of this research is that
it had a small sample size—consisting only of sixty-three participants. Id. at 3.
257. Id. at 61.
258. Id.
259. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 265.
260. Id. at 267.
261. Id. at 270.
262. Id. at 247. One study estimated the earnings reduction to be as high as forty percent.
Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 13 (2010).
263. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 103.
264. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 95.
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It has been suggested that one cannot grade the severity of penalties
265
because painfulness is a subjective concept. A taxidriver who is deprived of
his or her licence feels the pain more severely than a person who works from
home. This is no doubt true, but the same applies regarding the harm caused by
criminal offences. Pickpocketing US$5 from Bill Gates is hardly likely to
cause him even the slightest angst, whereas stealing the last US$5 from a
hungry, homeless person may have a devastating effect upon him or her.
Despite the enormous difference in the impact of these offences, the law has no
difficulty in making theft an offence, and [secondly], it has not resiled from
266
evaluating the general seriousness of such conduct.
This is because in
relation to any branch of law, generalisations must be made about the things
that people value and the typical effect of certain behaviour on those
267
interests.

6.

Matching the Punishment to the Offense: Worst Crimes to the Worst
Forms of Punishment

The final problem regarding proportionality is how to match the severity of
the punishment with the seriousness of the offence. The relative brevity of this
discussion is not a reflection of the importance or the level of controversy in
this area. Rather, given the discussion above, the answer is straightforward.
The type and degree of punishment imposed on offenders should cause them to
have their well-being set back to an amount equal to that which the crime sets
268
back the well-being of the victim.

This is in keeping with the approach of some other theorists. Von Hirsch
asserts that an interests analysis, similar to the living-standard analysis he
adopts for gauging crime seriousness, should be used to estimate the severity
of penalties.269 Ashworth states that proportionality at the outer limits

265. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 99 (1991). The same observation is made by von Hirsch
and Ashworth who note that a complicating factor is individuals will suffer differently from
imprisonment, especially when mental harm is also factored into the assessment. VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 185; see also RYBERG, supra note
112, at 102–03. However, this subjective variability is not an insurmountable problem. Law by its
nature must regulate all human conduct and involves making estimates according to the
sensibilities and impact on the typical person; hence, we see that bright lines are drawn around
gray areas, such as voting and driving ages.
266. At least in terms of setting maximum, and sometimes fixed, penalties for such conduct.
267. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 95–96; Mirko Bagaric, From
Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While
Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 408 (2014). Another potential
problem is whether the incidental effects of punishment, such as loss of employment and
reputation, should be factored into the assessment. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 110. They can be
overcome if one adopts an objectivist approach and takes into account the net punishment. Mirko
Bagaric, The Disunity of Employment Law and Sentencing, 68 J. CRIM. L. 329, 332 (2004).
268. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 96.
269. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 34–35.
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“excludes punishments which impose far greater hardships on the offender
than does the crime on victims and society in general.”270
The above approach “assesses both the hardship of punishment and the
severity of crime from the perspective of the extent to which they set back
typical human well-being. This enables a theoretical matching at least to be
made. There are insufficient data currently to allow a precise ranking.”271
In order for proportionality to play a more definitive role in sentencing,
there is a need for further relevant empirically-validated research. It is beyond
the realm of lawyers, criminologists, and jurists to complete this task, which
requires drawing on findings in other disciplines, in particular, sociology and
psychology. There is a need to tailor the research to focus on victims of crime
and, in particular, offenders who have been subjected to criminal sanctions.
While development of the proportionality doctrine is in its early stages,
there are some tentative observations that can be made, which can provide
concrete guidance to legislators and judges. First, the crimes that have the most
serious adverse consequences for victims are assault and sexual offenses.
Secondly, the adverse effects of imprisonment seem to have been underrated
and often extend to more distant forms of serious harms, including
significantly reduced life expectancy. In light of this, a reasonable starting
point is that, generally, imprisonment should be imposed only for sexual and
violent offenses, and most prison terms should be reduced compared to those
currently imposed. Of course, this says nothing about the length of
imprisonment that is appropriate for certain categories of sexual and violent
offenses. Yet, this crude empirically-based technique is preferable to the
randomness that currently exists in relation to offense and sanction matching.
V. RETAINING THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Despite the large number of fixed penalties in the United States, they are
widely despised by commentators in the United States and beyond. It has been
noted that this is especially the case in Australia and the United Kingdom,
where judges “in some sense [feel that they] own sentencing and that
legislative encumbrances on that ownership are inherently inappropriate.”272 In
the United States context, Michael Tonry notes that: “The greatest gap between
knowledge and policy in American sentencing concerns mandatory penalties.
Experienced practitioners and social science researchers have long agreed, for
practical and policy reasons . . . that mandatory penalties are a bad idea.”273

270. ASHWORTH, supra note 157, at 97.
271. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 96.
272. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Reform Across National Boundaries, in THE POLITICS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 267, 269 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995).
273. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996).
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Such sentiments are widely held. In a forum devoted to the concept of
mandatory sentencing legislation in a leading Australian law journal,274 there
were eight separate papers on the topic, and there was not a single nice word to
be had for mandatory sentences. Despite this, all of the criticisms are overstated; they can all be surmounted by the implementation of proportionate
fixed penalties. Before we analyze the key criticisms of fixed penalties, we
discuss their main benefit.
A.

Fixed Penalties Are Necessary for Transparent and Consistent Sentencing

While fixed penalties are unpopular, they are less bad than the alternative:
wide-ranging penalty ranges whereby it is left to the discretion of the
sentencing judge to implement the exact penalty. This is the process that
previously prevailed in the United States and led Justice Marvel Frankel to
describe the system as lawless.275 It is the current system that operates in
Australia and is responsible for a largely unpredictable and inconsistent
sentencing system.
The overarching methodology and conceptual approach that [Australian]
sentencing judges undertake in making sentencing decisions is [known as the]
“instinctive synthesis.” The term originates from the Full Court of the Supreme
Court of Victoria decision of R v Williscroft, where Adam and Crockett JJ
stated: “Now, ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing
judge’s instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in the punitive
276
process[.]”
The process of instinctive synthesis is a mechanism whereby sentencers
make a decision regarding all of the considerations that are relevant to
sentencing, and then give due weight to each of them (and, in the process,
incorporate considerations that incline to a heavier penalty and offset against
them factors that favour a lesser penalty), and then set a precise penalty. The
hallmark of this process is that it does not require (nor permit) judges to set out
277
with any particularity the weight (in mathematical terms) accorded to any
278
particular consideration.

274. 22 U. N.S. WALES L.J. (1999).
275. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1972). For a
critique of his impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin Frankel’s Mistakes and the
Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 239 (2008).
276. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 79; R v
Williscroft [1975] VR 292 (Austl.).
277. With minor exceptions discussed in Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to
Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at Part VI.
278. Id. at 79–80.
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Patent subjectivity is incorporated into the sentencing calculus.
279

Current orthodoxy maintains that there is no single correct sentence,
and
that the “instinctive synthesis will, by definition, produce outcomes upon
280
which reasonable minds will differ[.]” Under this model, courts can impose
a sentence within an “available range” of penalties. The spectrum of this range
281
is not clearly designated.
Predicting or anticipating the likely outcome of this process is made much
harder by the fact that it is for the court to determine the weight to be accorded
282
to any particular aggravating or mitigating factor. There is no effective fetter
to prevent courts from giving, say, 40 per cent or 2 per cent weight to a
283
particular consideration, such as remorse, in order to mitigate a penalty, or
an aggravating factor such as prior criminality in order to increase the
284
penalty.
As noted in DPP (VIC) v Terrick: “The proposition that too
much—or too little—weight was given to a particular sentencing factor is
almost always untestable. This is so because quantitative significance is not to
285
be assigned to individual considerations.”
In Pesa v The Queen, the Court acknowledged that the absence of the
attribution of weight to considerations in sentencing decisions made them
“opaque”:
[So far as weight is concerned] the ultimate sentencing decision is entirely
opaque. While the sentencing reasons record the judge’s consideration of
the various matters relevant to sentence, the sentencing decision itself is a
conclusion arrived at by the process of intuitive synthesis, without the
286
attribution of weight to any individual factor.

A key problem with the instinctive synthesis is that it leads to inconsistent
sentences. There is considerable evidence to support this proposition.

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25 (Austl.).
Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 206 (Austl.).
Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 80.
Pesa v The Queen [2012] VSCA 109 (Austl.).
See Mirko Bagaric, An Argument for Uniform Australian Sentencing Law, 37
AUSTRALIAN B. REV. 40, 58 (2013). For an example of where a considerable amount of weight
was given to remorse, see CD v The Queen [2013] VSCA 95 (Austl.).
284. The amount of weight given to a sentencing factor is only erroneous if it results in a
sentence being manifestly excessive or inadequate. DPP (Vic) v Terrick [2009] VSCA 220
(Austl.).
285. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 91; DPP v
Terrick [2009] VSCA 220 (Austl.).
286. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 91; Pesa v The
Queen [2012] VSCA 109 (Austl.).
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[T]he Australian Law Reform Commission report, Same Crime, Same Time:
287
The Sentencing of Federal Offenders, looked at sentences across Australia
involving the same offences (focusing on drug and fraud offences where the
288
courts were all applying the federal sentencing regime),
and noted
289
considerable differences in penalties across the jurisdictions.
For example, the report looked at 63 instances of trafficking a commercial
quantity of MDMA (3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methamphetamine, or Ecstasy)
290
during the five-year period 2000–2004. The jurisdictions where most cases
occurred were New South Wales, Western Australia and Victoria. Overall, the
mean terms (maximum and minimum) combined for all three states were 136
and 66 months, respectively, while for each individual state they were as
follows: in New South Wales: 154: 72; Western Australia: 132: 69; Victoria:
291
66: 39.
For a commercial quantity of heroin there were 155 cases, of which 86 per
292
cent involved this charge only.
The mean term for these three states
combined was 87: 48, but, once again, there were considerable regional
differences for each state; i.e., in New South Wales: 81: 48; Western Australia:
293
169:70; Victoria: 65:43.
The level of inconsistency is also demonstrated by research reports which
compare similarly placed offenders who are subjected to vastly different
penalties. The most recent example of this is a 2013 report by the Victorian
Advisory Council entitled Reoffending Following Sentencing in the
294
Magistrates’ Court of Victoria.
One of the purposes of this report was to
ascertain whether offenders who were sentenced to imprisonment reoffended
295
at different rates from those sentenced to other sanctions. To this end, the
empirical data show that harsh punishment does not discourage offenders from

287. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, SAME CRIME, SAME TIME REPORT: SENTENCING
FEDERAL OFFENDERS (Apr. 2006), http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publica
tions/ALRC103.pdf [http://perma.cc/3BK9-26MS].
288. Id. at 512.
289. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 84.
290. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 287, at 877.
291. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 84;
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 287, at 877.
292. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 287, at 878.
293. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 84;
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 287, at 880. In 2008, the High Court in Adams
v R [2008] HCA 15 (Austl.) ruled that there is no difference in drug seriousness for sentencing
purposes. Thus, the disparity between sentences for MDMA and heroin is no longer justified. R v
Robertson (1989) 44 A Crim R 224, 229 (Austl.).
294. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, REOFFENDING FOLLOWING SENTENCING IN THE
MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF VICTORIA (June 2013), https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/
sites/default/files/publication-documents/Reoffending%20Following%20Sentencing%20in%
20the%20Magistrates’%20Court%20of%20Victoria.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HXT-YY45].
295. Id. at 4.
OF
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further offending and, in fact, may even result in a higher incidence of future
296
offending. The theory of specific deterrence is false. The report supported
this finding—i.e., offenders sentenced to imprisonment generally reoffended at
297
a higher rate than those subjected to more lenient dispositions.
This
298
information is not new.
The most illuminating aspect of the report for the purposes of this article is
the manner in which the conclusion was derived. The methodology involved
comparing the recidivism rates of offenders who had been sentenced to
imprisonment with those who were subjected to more lenient dispositions,
299
including wholly suspended sentences.
This involved controlling the
respective samples for factors that could influence the result (eg, prior criminal
300
record, age, offence type and sex). Thus, the methodology involved using
matched sub-samples.
It is striking that identically situated offenders could be subjected to such
vastly different outcomes. This can only occur against the backdrop of a
largely unfettered judicial sentencing discretion, without adequate regard to the
301
need for consistency in the outcome of sentences.

B.

Fixed Penalties Are Necessary to Minimize Subconscious Bias in
Sentencing

The key problem with a largely unfettered sentencing discretion is that it
invariably leads to the sentences based on the personal predispositions of
judges; the process is inherently non-transparent and inconsistent.
Judges are understandably outcome driven, but what often makes the
outcomes unacceptable are the hidden influences which underpin them. All
humans have preferences and biases. The most difficult to negate are those of
which the holder is unaware. Judges, like all people, view themselves as being
objective and fair while having a bias blind spot when it comes to their own
302
decision-making.
Judge Richard Posner in his seminal work, How Judges
Think, states: “We use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations of bias,
303
while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify bias in others.”
The default position of people “is to assume that their judgments are

296. Id. at 31.
297. Id. at 29.
298. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 84–85; see
supra Part III.
299. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 294, at 10.
300. Id. at 8.
301. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 85.
302. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Matthew Taksin, Can Judges Determine Their Own
Impartiality?, 41 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 24 (2010).
303. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 121 (2008).
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304

uncontaminated” with implicit bias and that “judges are inclined to make the
same sorts of favourable assumptions about their own abilities that non-judges
305
do[.]” The truth is otherwise. All people are influenced by their life journey
and “are more favourably disposed to the familiar, and fear or become
306
frustrated with the unfamiliar[.]”
The evidence regarding the impact of implicit judicial bias is considerable.
The range of traits that influence the outcome of decisions is wide-ranging.
Thus, we see that attractive offenders receive more lenient penalties than other
accused—except when the attractive appearance is used to facilitate the
307
crime. In one study, 77 per cent of unattractive defendants received a prison
term, while only 46 per cent of attractive defendants were subjected to the
308
same penalty. Thus, unattractive people are approximately 50 per cent more
309
likely to be imprisoned than attractive people.
Gender also influences sentences, with a United States study examining
over [20,000] records showing that females are treated more leniently than
310
males.
There is firm evidence of judicial bias on the basis of race. Jeffrey
Rachlinski [and Sheri Johnson] show that white judges display a strong white
preference in their decisions, while black judges display no overall
311
preference. They note that a key way to deal with this is to bring the biases
to the surface: “[W]hen judges are aware of a need to monitor their own
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to
312
suppress that bias, they appear able to do so[.]”

304. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 185, 190 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
305. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1228 (2009).
306. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 105–06; Rose
Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 24 JUDGES’ J. 6, 53 (1985).
307. Birte Englich, Heuristic Strategies and Persistent Biases in Sentencing Decisions, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 295, 304 (Margit E. Oswald et al. eds., 2009).
308. John E. Stewart, II, Defendant’s Attractiveness as a Factor in the Outcome of Criminal
Trials: An Observational Study, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 348, 354 (1980).
309. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 106.
310. Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of RaceEthnicity on Criminal Sanctioning? Sentences for Male and Female White, Black, and Hispanic
Defendants, 22 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 241, 249, 257 (2006); see also David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal
Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001) (females receive a twelve percent shorter penalty than
males).
311. Rachlinski et al., supra note 305, at 1210.
312. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 106; Rachlinski
et al., supra note 305, at 1221.
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Racial discrimination in sentencing has been long documented. In one
of the most wide-ranging surveys, using data from over 77,000 offenders that
were sentenced, the data revealed that a black defendant who is sentenced in
the same court and who commits the same offence and has the same criminal
history as a white accused, will receive a 12 per cent longer prison term than a
314
white offender.
Judicial bias extends well beyond race to matters such as socioeconomic
background. A recent analysis of child custody cases showed that judges
favour wealthy litigants to those who are impoverished, leading to worse case
315
outcomes for people of low incomes.
Victim traits also impact sentencing outcomes. Black offenders who harm
white victims were found to receive heavier penalties than when the victim
was black, presumably because “the judges were also White, and their ingroup or worldview was more threatened by criminal conduct against persons
316
from their in-group[.]”
The mindset of a judge also influences the outcome of criminal cases. In
one study, a mock file (where the offender was charged with prostitution) was
assigned to judges who were requested to set bail. Half of the judges were
instructed to think about their own death before setting bail. It transpired that
they set bail at a much higher amount (US$455) compared to the control group
317
(US$50).
The comfort level of a judge affects case outcome. In a recent study,
offenders were better treated after, rather than before, a judicial meal break. A
study examining the decisions of a parole court in Israel over a 10 month
period, and taking into account over 1000 rulings, ascertained that the single
biggest influence on whether a prisoner was granted parole was the length of
318
time that had passed since the judge had a meal break.
After the meal
breaks, judges would grant parole at the rate of 65 per cent and it would drop

313. Ochi, supra note 306, at 7–8.
314. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 106; Mustard,
supra note 310, at 292, 300.
315. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 106–07;
Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 158–
60 (2013).
316. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 107; Siegfried
L. Sporer & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Disparities in Sentencing Decisions, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT OF CRIME, supra note 307, at 379, 390.
317. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 107; Abram
Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality Salience
on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 681, 682 (1989).
318. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 6889, 6889–90 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf [http://per
macc/8SE5-NXM2].
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to between 0 and 10 per cent as time wore on.
that the reason for this was because:

223

The researchers speculated

[A]ll repetitive decision-making tasks drain our mental resources. We start
suffering from “choice overload” and we start opting for the easiest
choice. . . . And when it comes to parole hearings, the default choice is to
deny the prisoner’s request. The more decisions a judge has made, the
more drained they are, and the more likely they are to make the default
320
choice. Taking a break replenishes them.
A type of bias that has potentially important implications for sentencing
. . . is what is known as the “anchoring effect[.]” Research shows that judges,
like all people, are affected by the requests and demands of others, including
prosecutors and even inexperienced people regarding their expectation of
321
sentence.
322

[T]he anchoring effect . . . is a bias people form towards evaluating numbers
by focusing on a numerical reference point and making adjustments from that
point. Most people place disproportionate emphasis on the initial anchor, so far
323
as it impacts their final figure. One study showed that experienced judges
were influenced by submissions regarding sentence, even if they were not
made by experts. In the study, a computer science student who was acting in
the role of a prosecutor made either a demand for a high sentence (34 months)
324
or low sentence (12 months) for the identical crime (rape).
The judges who received the high demand gave a sentence, which, on
average, was eight months longer than those who received the demand for
the lower sentence. This study confirms results in other studies focusing
on damages awards in civil cases and in non-legal settings that show that
325
even arbitrary and irrelevant numbers have an anchoring effect.

319. Id. at 6890.
320. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 107–08; Ed
Yong, Justice Is Served, but More so After Lunch: How Food-Breaks Sway the Decisions of
Judges, DISCOVER MAG. (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocket
science/2011/04/11/justice-is-served-but-more-so-after-lunch-how-food-breaks-sway-the-deci
sions-of-judges/#.UyA57YUt18F [http://perma.cc/UL99-DQ94].
321. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 108.
322. Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be
Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667, 1669 (2013).
323. Thomas Mussweiler et al., Anchoring Effect, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK
ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 183, 185 (Rüdiger F. Pohl
ed., 2004).
324. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 108; Birte
Enough & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the
Courtroom, 31 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1541–42 (2001).
325. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 108. For a
discussion of the relevant studies, see Miller, supra note 322, at 1697; see also Stephanos Bibas,
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2518 (2004) (observing
that anchoring gives prosecutors great power to influence judges’ sentences).
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More subtle studies undertaken in the criminal law setting suggest that
prosecution sentencing submissions have a considerable influence on judges,
which are only partly moderated by contrary defense submissions. This may be
partly because “defense attorneys assimilate their sentencing demand to the
326
327
demand from the prosecutor[,]”
and that is an “unintended process[.]”
The suggested reason for this is the sequence in the courtroom:
By granting the defense attorney the right of the last word, the legal system
simultaneously grants the prosecutor the right of the first word. This
allows the prosecution to introduce a judgmental anchor that determines
the final sentence, by influencing the judge not only directly, but also (and
predominantly) indirectly via its influence on the defense attorney’s
328
demand.

The way to negate judicial subconscious bias is to limit the ambit of the
judicial discretion.
As noted by Posner, judges, like all people, are utility maximizers and gain
satisfaction from different aspects of their role, including its prestige and
329
influence. In making decisions, judges give effect to their own preferences,
which are contingent upon their “background, temperament, training,
experience, and ideology, which shape his [or her] preconceptions and thus his
330
[or her] response to arguments and evidence[.]”
[Absent legislative curtailment of the sentencing discretion,] [j]udges are
unlikely to make the sentencing determination process more clear and in the
process reduce their capacity to craft a decision affirming what they believe is
the appropriate result. This would be inconsistent with human nature.
Individuals have a preference to shape the world in light of their preferences
and beliefs. There is an innate desire for people to influence their surroundings.
From the perspective of judges, it means retaining as much capacity as
possible to impose their views on cases before them. This desire is
understandable but should not be accommodated in a system governed by rules
331
instead of by men and women.

It is for this reason that sentencing outcomes should be guided by clear,
transparent, and prescriptive rules. This is best achieved by a fixed penalty
regime.

326. Birte Englich et al., The Last Word in Court—A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense,
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 717 (2005).
327. Id.
328. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 108–09.
329. POSNER, supra note 303, at 35–36.
330. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 110; POSNER,
supra note 303, at 249.
331. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 110–11.
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C. Fixed Penalties Are Not Necessarily Too Severe
The most common criticism of fixed penalties is that they are too severe.
As noted above, fixed penalties are invariably introduced as part of a tough-oncrime agenda,332 and thus it is not surprising that such an objection would be
forthcoming.333 The harshness of fixed penalty systems has resulted in several
law reform bodies, and the like, coming down firmly against introducing fixed
penalties.334
The criticism that fixed penalties are too severe has been advanced in
several different ways. While these are normally put forward as discrete
reasons for rejecting fixed penalties, in effect they are no more than an
elucidation of the undesirable consequences that follow when unduly harsh
criminal sanctions (fixed or not) are imposed. We now examine the supposed
negative unintended consequences of fixed penalties.
Research regarding trial rates in the United States federal jurisdiction
shows that in response to the severe Federal Sentencing Guidelines more
offenders pleaded guilty and the acquittal rate in relation to fixed penalty
matters was lower.335 This is consistent with evidence that juries in England in
the eighteenth century would refuse to convict offenders who were “guilty” of
offenses carrying a mandatory death penalty.336
More trials and incongruous jury verdicts are no doubt undesirable, but
they are not unavoidable side effects of fixed sentences. The reason that
offenders may be disposed to more strenuously resist offenses that carry
mandatory sanctions and juries may try harder to acquit the accused charged
with such offenses is that the stakes are high—and indeed too high. If fixed
penalties were set at more moderate levels, the motivation for both of these
side effects would dissipate.337
Another objection to fixed penalties is that they lead to surreptitious
avoidance tactics by criminal justice officials. There is evidence that in
jurisdictions where harsh fixed penalties apply, police, prosecutors, and judges

332. See Neil Morgan, Capturing Crims or Capturing Votes? The Aims and Effects of
Mandatories, 22 U. N.S. WALES L.J. 267, 267–69 (1991) (stating that fixed penalties are
introduced because judges are not being tough enough on crime).
333. See infra Part V(D) (discussing that some fixed penalty systems have been introduced to
achieve more principled aims).
334. NEW S. WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 33: SENTENCING 258 (Apr.
1996); see THE LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 44: SENTENCING, at xviii–xxxi (1988).
335. TONRY, supra note 273, at 148–50.
336. Id. at 142–44.
337. The evidence certainly favors such a view. Where fixed penalties are not unduly severe,
there is no research or empirical evidence to support such matters. For example, there is nothing
to suggest that the mandatory minimum penalties for drunk driving, which are present in most
Australian jurisdictions, have resulted in longer or more not guilty pleas.
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devise innovative ways to avoid the operation of such laws.338 For example, it
has been established that some prosecutors in the United States circumvent the
application of severe mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines by charging offenders with different, but roughly
similar, offenses that are not subject to mandatory penalties.339 Where
offenders are charged under these provisions, judges sometimes side-step the
mandatory minimums by techniques such as refusing to find facts (such as the
use of a firearm), which would trigger their operation; or simply not invoking
the applicable penalties on the assumption that neither of the parties will
appeal the sentence.340 There is also evidence that prosecutors use mandatory
provisions in order to exert pressure on the accused to plead guilty to similar
offenses to those charged but which do not carry a mandatory sentence.341 As a
result, there is a significant shift in discretion from judges to prosecutors.342
Again, these problems are no more than a rehash of the more fundamental
objection that some fixed penalties are too tough. If the legislature does set
excessively high penalties and gets it about right in terms of equating the level
of the penalty to the seriousness of the offense, prosecutors could not use the
threat of mandatory penalties as a weapon to coerce guilty pleas, and it is
unlikely that criminal justice officials would seek to circumvent the operation
of such laws—there would be no reason to do so.
Thus the criticism that fixed penalties are too tough and lead to undesirable
side effects can be answered if more lenient fixed penalties are set. However,
setting lower penalties simply in order to avoid the undesirable consequences,
which flow from harsh fixed penalties, is not appropriate. The harm caused to
the community by letting criminals off too lightly may outweigh any benefits
flowing from improvements in the efficiency and consistency of the sentencing
system. “Softer” penalties should only be fixed if they are justifiable on the

338. TONRY, supra note 273, at 147, 150; Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of
Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 65, 65–67 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009) [hereinafter Tonry, The Mostly
Unintended Effects].
339. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects, supra note 338, at 65–67.
340. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN
SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING 29, 226 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES]; Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 509 (1992); VICTORIAN SENTENCING COMM., SENTENCING
REPORT 169 (Apr. 1988).
341. TONRY, supra note 273, at 150.
342. Id. at 151; Russell Hogg, Mandatory Sentencing Legislation and the Symbolic Politics of
Law and Order, 22 U. N.S. WALES L.J. 262, 263–64 (1999).
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basis of more general criteria. As noted in Part VI, this in fact follows from
application of the principle of proportionality.343
D. Fixed Penalties Can Accommodate Validated Mitigating and Aggravating
Factors
The other main criticism of fixed penalties is that they are not sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the full ambit of relevant sentencing variables, and, as
a result, different cases are not treated differently. This violates what Tonry
believes is the paramount objective of sentencing: fairness. Fixed sentences, he
believes, are well equipped to achieve one aspect of the fairness equation:
treating like cases alike; but are unable to adequately deal with the other limb:
treating different cases differently.344 In a similar vein, the New South Wales
Law Reform Commission rejected fixed penalties partly because it believed
they provide limited opportunity for addressing the subjective features of the
offender or the offense hence leading to injustice.345
This criticism is not insurmountable. It can be met by identifying all
possible justifiable fixed penalties and ascribing a pre-determined weight to
each of them. To ascertain which considerations are properly relevant to the
determination of how much to punish, it is necessary to develop and apply a
coherent theory of mitigation and aggravation. One of us has undertaken this
recently:346
[C]onsiderations which lower a penalty can be divided into four categories: the
circumstances of the offense; the offender’s response to a charge; matters
personal to the offender; and the impact of the sanction on the offender and his
or her dependants. As far as factors that increase penalty, the categories are:
the offender’s criminal history; the manner in which the offense was
347
committed; the nature of the victim; and the outcome of the offense.
While that is the conventional manner in which aggravating and mitigating
considerations are categorised, it stems from a desire for expediency rather
than an approach derived from conceptual interrogation. The existing
classifications provide a neat and orderly methodology for lawyers and judges
who need to identify and catalogue established aggravating and mitigating
considerations; however, they do not give any insight into the possible
348
rationale and foundation for the considerations.

343.
344.
345.
346.
at 1161.
347.
348.

See infra Part VI.
Tonry, supra note 272, at 272, 278.
NEW S. WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 79: SENTENCING 10 (1996).
Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
Id. at 1195.
Id.
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The more illuminating pathway to explaining and justifying aggravating
and mitigating considerations is to place them in the multi-dimensional
institutional construct within which they operate. In terms of the increasing
breadth of operation, there are three such institutions. The first is the
sentencing system. This system does not exist in a vacuum and is subsumed
within the broader system of criminal justice and the over-arching system of
law and justice. Hence, the second perspective is the criminal justice system,
and the third is the legal system in general. As we shall see, the objectives of
349
these systems are not always identical.
The starting point in grounding aggravating and mitigating considerations
is that they should be abolished unless a cogent justification is given in light of
the objectives of these three institutions. [We] commence this inquiry by
350
focusing on the sentencing system.
From this perspective a consideration should only operate to increase or
decrease penalty if it promotes a sentencing objective which itself is
351
justified.

As we have seen:
[C]urrent empirical evidence provides no basis for confidence that sentencing
is capable of achieving most of the goals of sentencing [in the form of specific
deterrence, marginal general deterrence, and rehabilitation] and hence they
should not drive the selection of aggravating and mitigating considerations.
The one exception to this is the incapacitation of serious sexual and violent
352
offenders.
Thus, from the perspective of the aims of the sentencing system, very few
considerations should increase or decrease penalty. The objective of absolute
deterrence is satisfied merely be ensuring that the penalty invoked is
something that offenders would seek to avoid, that is, they find it unpleasant. It
does not have to be particularly harsh. It is satisfied by a prison term—long or
353
short—or, for that matter, probation or a non-trivial fine.

Incapacitation serves to justify a prison term for serious sexual and violent
offenders. Moreover, as noted earlier, recidivist offenders who commit serious
violent or sexual offenses should receive a penalty loading, albeit one that is
lighter than is currently the situation. The premium that should be imposed for
these types of offenses on recidivists is twenty to fifty percent.354 Also, first
time offenders (for all forms of offenses) are less likely to recidivate than

349.
350.
351.
at 1196.
352.
353.
354.

Id.
Id.
Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1215.
Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 93, at 411.
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repeat offenders. This justifies mitigation being accorded to offenders without
a prior history.
An especially controversial issue relating to mitigating factors is the extent
to which the character and past deeds of an offender (beyond merely their past
criminal history) should impact the sentence. Past positive contributions should
not mitigate criminal sanctions because they do not bear on the objectives of
the sentencing system. There is no evidence that charity workers, for example,
recidivate less frequently than other offenders. Further, there are no wider
principles of law and justice that support punishing offenders who have
committed commendable acts less harshly. In a market-based system, many
good acts are rewarded financially, and, where there is no financial benefit,
people often receive non-tangible rewards in the form of feelings of
satisfaction and accomplishment. Thus, to confer a sentencing discount for past
acts would be to ‘double-dip’ when it comes to acknowledging such behavior.
Thus, no good acts should mitigate penalty.
The above analysis supports a very limited number of aggravating or
mitigating factors. Intuitively, this runs counter to entrenched sentencing
methodology where many variations in the manner in which a crime is
committed and the consequence of a crime can be important aggravating
considerations. One seemingly novel conclusion stemming from the above
analysis is that it runs counter to the view that premeditated criminal acts and
those which cause grave harm to victims should be treated more harshly than
substantive offenses of the same nature which are committed spontaneously
and cause little harm to a victim. Moreover, offenders who are solely
responsible for a criminal act or who have a key role in an offense are
currently treated more severely than those who have a minor role. However,
this discord does not, in fact, follow from [our] approach. Rather, these
principles are accommodated within a different sentencing layer:
355
proportionality, as opposed to the objectives of sentencing.
Unlike the objectives of sentencing considered thus far, proportionalism is
concerned with how much to punish as opposed to the logically prior issue of
why we should punish. The content of the proportionality principle means,
logically, that several mitigating and aggravating considerations are embedded
356
within its construct.

While, as we have seen, the content of the proportionality principle is not
firmly established:
[I]t is clear that a cardinal criterion is the extent to which it sets back the
interests and flourishing of victims. Accordingly, homicide offenses are the
most serious. Offenses causing considerable degrees of permanent

355. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
at 1215–16.
356. Id. at 1216.
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impairment—whether physical or mental—also rate highly, as do sexual
offenses. Culpability is also an entrenched aspect of this limb of the
357
proportionality thesis.
Thus, it follows that considerations that relate to culpability are capable of
aggravating or mitigating penalty. For this reason, planned offenses are more
serious than those committed spontaneously, and offenders who have a central
358
role in a crime are more blameworthy than peripheral players.
Further, the impact of the crime on victims and the effect of the sanction
on offenders should also impact the penalty. Acts by offenders which reduce
the level of the harm stemming from the offense should be mitigatory. This
consideration applies most acutely in relation to property offenses because the
value of the loss can be measured precisely (apart from where the property has
sentimental value). It is manifest that a victim who has $10,000 stolen from
him or her which is returned by the offender suffers less than a victim of a
359
$10,000 theft who receives no restitution.
On the other side of the proportionality equation, the same reasoning
applies. The main criterion regarding penalty severity is the extent to which the
penalty sets back the interests and flourishing of offenders. Prison is damaging
because human beings have an innate desire for freedom and the capacity to
shape their activities and lives according to their preferences. Moreover,
certain prison conditions are considerably harsher than those typically
designated by this type of sanction. The harshest prison conditions are those
360
found in super-maximum prisons.

Offenders who are subjected to this form of punishment for reasons not of their
doing, should receive a shortened prison term.
Having ascertained the mitigating and aggravating factors that stem from
the objectives of sentencing and proportionalism, it is necessary to widen the
examination to determine whether the substantive criminal law underpins any
such considerations. Ostensibly, the answer is no. The substantive criminal law
demarcates the distinction between behavior that is a crime and that which
attracts no criminal liability. This distinction is done by setting out the nature
of criminal acts, each of which is separated into distinct elements, and defining

357. Id. at 1219.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1219–20.
360. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
at 1220. They have defined as “a free-standing facility, or a distinct unit within a facility, that
provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been officially designated
as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated. . . . [T]heir behavior can
be controlled only by separation, restricted movement, and limited direct access to staff and other
inmates.” Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a
Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 170 (1999); see also Chase Riveland, NAT’L INST. OF
CORR., SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 (Jan. 1999).
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defenses to those acts. Each criminal act has a maximum penalty, and, as we
361
saw [earlier] often a presumptive penalty.
The objectives of the substantive criminal law are reflected in the
designation of the type of behavior which is categorized as a crime and the
parameters as defined by the elements of the offense. Complex policy
decisions inform the decisions regarding which type of behavior to criminalize.
All western nations, with varying degrees of specificity, proscribe conduct that
involves deliberate infringements on the right to life, bodily integrity, sexual
autonomy, liberty and property. Criminalization often extends well beyond
these parameters to include behavior such as drug use and road traffic
compliance. Once these decisions have been made, there seems to be no
further scope for the elements of the crime to influence sentence, beyond the
362
sentence that has already been designated for the offense.
Thus, it might appear that a premeditated murder is more serious than a
spur-of-the-moment killing, and a $100,000 theft is worse than a theft of $10;
however, if these differences are meaningful, they should presumably be
reflected either in the different substantive classification of the offenses or
maximum or presumptive penalties. In fact, this often is the case. . . . Once
these parameters are set and accommodated, the impact of the substantive
363
criminal law on sentencing is arguably exhausted.
However, on closer reflection, an area of substantive criminal law which
can influence mitigating and aggravating considerations is criminal defenses.
In general, the substantive criminal law draws strict lines relating to the
applicability of defenses. All criminal law systems have narrow and often
technical defenses to crime. They are often based on general over-arching
excuses and justifications which are recognized in some form by most western
criminal justice systems. The key excuses which can exculpate otherwise
criminal conduct are self-defense, duress or coercion, necessity and insanity.
The criteria for legal excuses are necessarily narrow due to the binary nature of
criminal law, that is, offenders are either guilty or innocent and, if the latter,
they are beyond the bounds of legal censure or punishment. Sentencing, on the
other hand, is not so clear-cut and there is potential scope for degrees of blame
and wrongdoing which can be accommodated by adjusting the level of
364
punishment.
Thus, circumstances that are similar to those which could attract a legal
defense, but fall short of constituting a criminal defense should potentially, at
least, constitute mitigating considerations. This approach has the additional
advantage of injecting a degree of coherency and consistency throughout the
criminal law system. All of the defenses have discrete elements that need to be

361.
at 1223.
362.
363.
364.

Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
Id.
Id. at 1223–24.
Id. at 1224.
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satisfied in order to excuse what is otherwise criminal behavior. The exact
content of these defenses varies slightly across jurisdictions. However, the
365
justification and rationale for the defenses are universal.
Failed criminal defenses have a link to exculpatory criminal behavior and,
hence, should logically attract mitigation. However, if they are to operate in
this way, their impact should be minor given that the substantive law has
determined that they fall short of meeting the elements of the defense. In
mathematical terms, such considerations warrant no more than, say, a ten
366
percent discount.
Intoxication is also a defense to crime in limited situations and, hence, can
potentially operate as a mitigating factor when the extent of intoxication is not
sufficient to constitute a defense. However, on balance, it should not operate in
this manner. The conceptual basis for intoxication operating as a defense is
disputable and there is a clear link between intoxication and crime. In
particular, a large amount of violence is alcohol-fuelled. The link between
alcohol and crime is well-known and it is foreseeable to most people that
consumption of alcohol may increase the likelihood of engaging in crime.
There is in fact a powerful argument for making intoxication an aggravating
factor . . . . Thus, it follows that alcohol consumption should not reduce
367
penalties.
Similar considerations apply in relation to provocation which is a defense
in some jurisdictions. Once again, the doctrinal underpinnings of the defense
are dubious. The main flaw in provocation as a defense is that it assumes that
people who lash out because of a loss of self-control are assumed to be less
blameworthy than those who harm others for other reasons. This presumption
assumes that anger is an emotion that should be accommodated by the law.
This rationale is flawed for two key reasons. First, anger should not be
rewarded more than other demonstrably less objectionable emotions. As noted
by Arenson et al.:
[T]here is no reason in logic or principle for allowing anger alone to serve
as an excuse. As noted by J. Horder,
why do we regard anger as an excusing condition but not killings
motivated by spite, greed, and lust? Or, for that matter, if the current
defense of provocation is used as a benchmark for the development of
legal principle, why do we not allow emotions that are palpably
desirable to be similarly excusatory when they manifest an intention to
kill? Is it justifiable that a person who kills another out of love and
kindness in a euthanasia scenario should be guilty of murder, yet an

365. Id. at 1224–25.
366. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
at 1225.
367. Id.
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accused who kills in anger should be convicted of the lesser crime of
368
voluntary manslaughter?
The other flaw with the provocation defense is that it relies on the
assumption that anger should exculpate crime because it is unavoidable. Thus,
369
provocation is viewed as a concession to the frailty of human nature
The
view that anger is a natural human feeling that reduces self-control, making
law-abiding behavior more difficult, is flawed. It has been noted that humans
have a far greater capacity to control emotions than is suggested by the
370
provocation defense.
Anger is an undesirable and damaging emotion. It is not a mindset that
should be accommodated by the law. Individuals need to take responsibility for
their conduct. Any legal principle that departs from this premise on the basis of
speculation (i.e., people cannot control their emotions) is flawed and should be
abolished and, hence, provocation should not be a mitigating factor in
371
sentencing.
While intoxication—and, in some cases, provocation—is a recognized
defense that should not be a mitigating consideration, there is one
consideration in which the reverse applies, in that it cannot provide a defense
to a criminal act but should be a mitigating factor. Several theorists have
argued that poverty should exculpate crime in some circumstances. While this
idea has not influenced the operation of the substantive criminal law,
[however], it is clear that wealth confers choice and opportunity, while poverty
is restrictive and often leads to frustration and resentment. Rich people who
commit crime are, arguably, more blameworthy than the poor who engage in
the same conduct because the capacity of the rich to do otherwise is greater.
Yet, it has been argued that we cannot allow poverty to mitigate criminal
punishment. Otherwise, we potentially license or encourage people to commit
crime. There is considerable force in this latter perspective. There is a nonreducible baseline standard of conduct that is expected of all individuals, no
matter how poor. It is never tolerable to inflict serious bodily or sexual injury
on another person. Deprived background should not mitigate such crimes.
However, a stronger argument can be made in favor of economic deprivation
mitigating other forms of offenses, such as drug and property crimes. In
relation to these offenses, the impact on victims is generally less severe and
hence, the burden of poverty is the more compelling consideration. It should be

368. Id. at 1226.
369. Law Reform Commissioner Victoria, Provocation as a Defence to Murder (Working
Paper No. 6, 1979), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/62008NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.
cc/ZN8B-KHQN].
370. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
at 1226–27.
371. Id. at 1227.
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reflected in a discount for impoverished non-violent and non-sexual
372
offenses.
The third point of reference that affects the choice of aggravating and
mitigating considerations is the legal system as a whole. Most of the objectives
of the legal system in general are too broad to drive any particular sentencing
considerations. At the broadest level, the objectives of the legal system involve
the need to co-ordinate, control and regulate human behavior by establishing
binding norms that comply with the cardinal rule of law virtues in the form of
373
clarity, certainty and fairness.
However, there are some particular pragmatic and doctrinal aspects of the
legal system which are capable of directing sentencing law and practice. The
main consideration of this nature is the need for efficiency in the disposition of
criminal matters. Justice should be swift. Accordingly, the state has an interest
in reducing the delay between the time of charge, verdict and sentence. There
is also a preference to minimize the cost of the legal system. Hence, measures
should be put in place to reduce the number of criminal trials. Offenders who
plead guilty are less of a financial burden on the community than those who
374
contest matters, and a guilty plea generally finalizes such matters faster.
Thus, a strong argument can be mounted for according a discount to
375
offenders who plead guilty.
Absent the guilty plea discount, there is no incentive for accused persons to
376
plead guilty, no matter how compelling the case against them.
Another aim of the law is to encourage legal observance and achieve
effective enforcement when the law is violated. Thus, a key aim of the legal
system is to reduce crime and make offenders accountable for their crimes. . . .
Thus, as a matter of public policy, the law should encourage those involved in
criminal behavior to betray the confidence reposed in each other by providing
a significant discount at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice system.
This is especially apposite given that it often places the offender in personal
377
danger.

It follows that the discount for cooperating with authorities should be
considerable given its importance to the legal system as a whole.
An even more wide-ranging objective of criminal justice is that the
innocent should not be punished. Accordingly, the impact of the penalty
visited on others is a relevant consideration. The impact of a sentence on
individuals other than the offender comes in degrees. Nearly every individual

372.
373.
374.
375.
at 1228.
376.
377.

Id. at 1227–28.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99,
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1231.
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is socially connected. However, some people are cardinal to the flourishing of
others. Offenders are sometimes the financial, social, and emotional
cornerstones to the lives of other individuals. Their confinement could have a
devastating impact on those closely associated to them; typically, their children
378
or spouse.
This hardship should be acknowledged in the form of a reduced sentence.
[Thus,] considerations should only aggravate or mitigate sentence if they are
justified by reference to one of four broader objectives, namely: (i) the
sentencing system; (ii) the proportionality principle; (iii) the criminal justice
379
system; or (iv) the wider well-established principles of justice.

Pursuant to the discussion above, there are seventeen considerations that
aggravate or mitigate penalty.380 They are set out in tabulated form below with
the amount of weight they should respectively carry.
VI. THE MODEL SENTENCING SYSTEM
In light of the above discussion, we are now in a position to set out a model
sentencing system. The starting point to a model sentencing system is to
determine which factors are relevant to sentencing. As we saw earlier, the level
at which criminal sanctions should be set is governed by the principle of
proportionality. In addition to this, all relevant aggravating and mitigating
considerations need to be incorporated.
Due to the broadness with which most criminal offenses are defined,381
offenses should be fragmented in order to distinguish more and less serious
instances of the same offense and treat them accordingly. Thus, for example, a
household burglary should carry a greater penalty than a burglary of
commercial premises, and a theft of property valued in excess of $10,000
should be treated more harshly than a theft of a lower amount.
In essence, the fixed penalty system should be structured along the lines of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to the extent that offenses are
compartmentalized into more and less serious instances of each type of
offense. However, three significant departures should be made from this
system. First, the penalty levels should be generally reduced. Secondly, far less
weight should be accorded to an offender’s criminal history. Thirdly, there

378. Id. at 1232.
379. Id. at 1235.
380. Cf. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note
99, at 1183 (contrasting the 200 to 300 mitigating and aggravating considerations in existence in
Australia); Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
340, at 15 (contrasting forty-three levels of consideration in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
381. See CANADIAN SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH
79, 186 (Feb. 1987) (stating broadness of criminal offenses was one of the reasons that the
Commission rejected the notion of mandatory penalties).
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should only be seventeen aggravating and mitigating factors (instead of the
forty that currently are recognized).
The ultimate upshot of our sentencing model is that the core variables in
sentencing should be reduced to the following considerations:
 There should be twenty-two penalty levels: starting at zero to six
months’ imprisonment with the next level increasing to twelve months.
 Each penalty level should then reflect an increase of twelve months.
Thus, level twenty-one would equal twenty years’ imprisonment. The
next and highest level should be life imprisonment.
 Each crime should have a standard penalty. This is determined by the
extent to which the typical form of that crime sets back the flourishing
of the typical victim.
 The only departures from this should arise from the list of seventeen
aggravating and mitigating considerations set out above.
In order to determine any particular sentence, there are only four
considerations that a judge needs to evaluate.
The first is the fixed penalty for the offense. The fixed level for every
offense should be set out by reference to penalty level, which are as follows.
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The First Reference Point: The Penalty Level
Penalty level

Duration of term of imprisonment

1

0-6 months

2

One year

3

Two years

4

Three years

5

Four years

6

Five years

7

Six years

8

Seven years

9

Eight years

10

Nine years

11

Ten years

12

Eleven years

13

Twelve years

14

Thirteen years

15

Fourteen years

16

Fifteen years

17

Sixteen years

18

Seventeen years

19

Eighteen years

20

Nineteen years

21

Twenty years

22

Life imprisonment
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Offenses that do not entail an imprisonment penalty will have a rating of
zero. This means that the judge is restricted to imposing a lesser type of
sanction, such as probation or a fine. The quantum of these sanctions should
also be set by reference to maximum levels.382
B.

The Second Reference Point: The Standard Penalties for Certain Crimes

The next consideration for a judge is to ascertain the fixed penalty level for
the relevant offense. There are more than a thousand offenses or variants of an
offense. The table below provides examples of the fixed penalty for twelve
well-known offenses and contrasts the penalty with the current penalty in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Offense

Penalty level

Theft

0383

Theft of more than $10,000

1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)384

Insider trading

1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)385

Trafficking small quantities of drugs
(e.g. less than 50 grams cocaine)

1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)386

Burglary of a residence

1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)387

Robbery
(without the use of a weapon)

2 (1 years’ imprisonment)388

Robbery with a weapon

3 (2 years’ imprisonment)389

382. These levels are beyond the scope of this Article.
383. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 81, 588 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/GLMFull.pdf [http://perma.
cc/5PU5-RXDX] (contrasting this as a level six offense, which carries a penalty range of zero to
eighteen months’ imprisonment).
384. Cf. Id. (contrasting this as a level ten offense, which carries a penalty range of six to
thirty months’ imprisonment).
385. Cf. Id. at 104, 588 (contrasting this as a level eight to fourteen offense, which carries a
penalty range of zero to forty-six months’ imprisonment).
386. Cf. Id. at 150, 588 (contrasting this as a level twelve offense, which carries a penalty
range of ten to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment).
387. Cf. Id. at 111, 588 (contrasting this as a level seventeen offense, which carries a penalty
range of twenty-four to sixty-three months’ imprisonment).
388. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2014), supra note 383, at 115, 588
(contrasting this as a level twenty offense, which carries a penalty range of thirty-three to eightyseven months’ imprisonment).
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Aggravated assault

6 (5 years’ imprisonment)390

Trafficking large quantities of drugs
(e.g. more than 450kg of cocaine)

6 (5 years’ imprisonment)391

Kidnapping with ransom demand

8 (7 years’ imprisonment) 392

Criminal sexual abuse (i.e. rape)

11 (10 years’ imprisonment)393

First degree murder

21 (20 years’ imprisonment)394

C. The Third Reference Point: Aggravating and Mitigating Considerations
The third step is to identify the aggravating and mitigating considerations.
These are confined to the seventeen considerations below.
AGGRAVATING CONSIDERATIONS
Maximum
Weight

Rationale

Prior criminal record for serious
sexual and violent offenses

50%

Incapacitation

High degree of involvement in
crime

10%

Proportionality
(culpability)

High degree of planning

10%

Proportionality
(culpability)

High level of harm

10%

Proportionality
(harm to victim)

Consideration

389. Cf. Id. (contrasting this as a level twenty-three to twenty-seven offense, which carries a
penalty range of 46–162 months’ imprisonment).
390. Cf. Id. at 53, 588 (contrasting this as a level fourteen to twenty-four offense, which
carries a penalty range of 15–125 months’ imprisonment).
391. Cf. Id. at 145, 588 (contrasting this as a level thirty-eight offense, which carries a penalty
range of 235 months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment).
392. Cf. Id. at 70, 588 (contrasting this as a level thirty-two to thirty-eight offense, which
carries a penalty range of 125 months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment).
393. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2014), supra note 383, at 57, 588
(contrasting this as a level thirty to thirty-eight offense, which carries a penalty range ninetyseven months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment).
394. Cf. Id. at 48, 588 (contrasting this as a level forty-three offense, which carries a penalty
of life imprisonment).
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MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS
Consideration

Maximum
Weight

Rationale

Severe impact from punishment
(e.g. harsh prison conditions)

50%

Proportionality
(harm to offender)

Plea of guilty

25%

Reduce delay and cost of
criminal justice system

Assisting authorities

25%

Reduce crime

Socioeconomic deprivation—only
for nonsexual and nonviolent
offenses

25%

Proportionality
(culpability)

Restitution of property

25%

Proportionality
(harm to victim)

No prior convictions

25%

Incapacitation

Harm to dependents of the
offender

20%

Innocent should not suffer

Incidental punishment

20%

Proportionality
(harm to offender)

Spontaneous offending

10%

Proportionality
(culpability)

Self-defense

10%

Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal law)

Necessity

10%

Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal law)

Duress or coercion

10%

Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal law)

Mental illness

10%

Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal law)
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D. The Fourth Reference Point: The Calibration (The Exact Sentence)
In terms of calibrating the penalty, the standard penalty needs to be
moderated by reference to the applicability of any relevant aggravating and
mitigating considerations. These factors do not operate in a simple cumulative
manner, otherwise, a combination of mitigating factors could potentially
amount to a discount of 100% or more. Instead, the discounts or additions are
to be applied individually, to the contracted or elevated sentence, following
application of the previous consideration. Thus, pleading guilty and assisting
authorities does not lead to a fifty percent discount of the entire sentence.
Rather, the discount is forty-three percent (i.e. twenty-five percent plus
seventy-five percent, the remaining part of the sentence, multiplied by twentyfive percent). Once the calibration of the aggravating and mitigating factors is
ascertained, these are then operationalized against each other to produce a clear
figure. Thus, if, for example, the aggravating factors arrive at thirty percent
and the mitigating factors are fifty percent, the sentence should be reduced by
twenty percent from the standard penalty.
VII. CONCLUSION
The sentencing system is broken. This is no surprise to any person with
even a cursory knowledge of the manner in which the system operates and the
limits of the state-operated system in actually attaining key sentencing
objectives. The gulf between sentencing practice and actual knowledge is
considerable. The refusal or failure of government to base sentencing practice
on sentencing information is the key reason for the current incarceration crisis.
The crisis has continued unabated because the government was not required to
critically examine the shortcomings of the system because criminals do not
engender meaningful empathy within the community.
The runaway train that is overly harsh penalties has finally turned full
circle to crash into the institution, which set it in on its ruinous journey.
Governments can no longer bear the crippling cost of mass incarceration.
Yet there is no indication that the response to the crisis will put in place a
durable, efficient, and fair solution. This Article attempts to remedy this
shortcoming. Sentencing is too important to continue getting wrong. It is the
process in which the state acts in its most coercive manner against its citizens.
This not only potentially damages individual citizens but, as is now manifest,
also the wider community.
The Article suggests that the key to improving the sentencing systems rests
in implementing proportionate sentences. This is a view shared by others,
including the United States National Research Council and the United
Sentencing Commission, which too endorse the proportionality principle. The
difference in our position is that we believe that proportionality in its current
form is an illusion. It is devoid of coherent content and this is partly the reason
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for its theoretical universal endorsement. No one has an interest in debunking a
principle, which is so malleable that it can be used to justify virtually any
sentencing stance. In reality, a principle, which stands for nothing, is no
principle at all: it is an expedient. And that is the current state of knowledge
regarding proportionality. This Article seeks to develop it from an expedient to
a principle.
We have provided a tentative account of the current state of learning
regarding the content of proportionality and the implications from this so far as
sentencing outcomes are concerned. We have also indicated the areas where
future research is necessary. This approach entails a vastly different sentencing
paradigm: one which is best pursued through a fixed penalty system.
All of the supposed shortcomings of fixed penalties can be overcome by
setting penalty ranges at proportionate levels. The benefit of fixed penalties is
that they will serve to maintain transparency, consistency, and predictability in
sentencing. There will be no curtailment of the need for individualized justice
given that pursuant to our model all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors
can be readily factored into any penalty calibration.
Implementation of our proposal will significantly lower prison numbers,
reduce racial disparity in sentencing, make the community no less safe, and
inject normative and doctrinal coherency into the sentencing system, while
retaining transparency and consistency. In short, prisons will be reserved for
those whom have damaged us and whom we have reason to fear: serious
violent and sexual offenders. We may still dislike and even hate other
offenders, such as drug distributors, fraudsters, and immigration offenders, but
(in normal circumstances) that dislike will no longer operate to unjustifiably
damage them and harm us in the form of public expenditure we cannot readily
afford.
Moreover, this Article has set out in concrete terms the penalties that
should be operated for key offenses and the exact mechanism by which key
sentencing considerations should be incorporated into the sentencing calculus.
The approach varies markedly from existing fixed penalty systems, but at the
minimum we hope that the framework will form the foundation for a genuinely
more enlightened age in sentencing.

